Notre Dame Law Reporter Vol. 3 Issue 2 by Notre Dame Law Reporter Association
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
Notre Dame Law Reporter Law School Publications
4-1922
Notre Dame Law Reporter Vol. 3 Issue 2
Notre Dame Law Reporter Association
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlaw_reporter
Part of the Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Reporter by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation








SUPREME COURT OF NOTRE DAME,
SIMPSON ET AL. VS. CARSON, ADMR. - - -
CARPER VS. WHITCOMB,-,- ------
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, CARPER VS. WHITCOMB
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CARPER VS. WHITCOMB
NOTRE DAME CIRCUIT, RECORD,--------
JUNIOR MOOT COURT, RECORD,------- - -
ONLY OUR OWN OPINION, -- - ------
CLASS-ICKS,
TOAST TO FRESHMEN, NOW SENIORS - -
LAW SCHOOL NEWS- - ------
Opinion of Court ---- 2
Opinion of Court ---- 8
Thos.Spencer McCabe 14
Arthur C. Keeney - - 18
Edwin J. McCarthy - 26
Clerk of Court ----- 29
Editorial Staff ----- 33
The Dean ------- 38
Aaron H. Huguenard 41
ALUMNI DEPARTMENT
CONTRIBUTION,
MEMORANDUM ON THE SHERMAN LAW, - Oliver E. Pagan ---- 43
NEWS SECTION
ABOUT THE ALUMNI -------- Bernard Vinc't Pater 49
THE ALUMNI DIRECTORY - - ----------- 51
UNITED STATES OF A:YE' ICA 1
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME S5
Be it remembered: That the Notre Dame Law Reporter
will be published at Notre Dame, Indiana, quarterly during
the scholastic year, for $2.00 per year or 50c per copy; that
the Reporter has been entered as second-class matter at
the Postoffice at Notre Dame, Indiana, and that copyright
has been granted.




NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
SUPREME COURT OF NOTRE DAME
SIMPSON et al. vs CARSON as Admr.
No. 12
Sale-Sale "on Approval"-Conditional
Sale-Title in Seller-When Passes-Pur-
chaser Manifesting Approval-Subsequent
Sale by Purchaser to Third Person-Not
Sufficient Approval to Acquire Seller's Title
-No Title in Third Person-Replevin by
Admr.-Insfructions Approved.
1. There are three transactions involv-
ing sale which are executory in character
and do not in themselves operate to trans-
fer title in property from. owner or seller
to purchaser, namely: (1)a bailment with
option in the bailee to purchase; (2) a sale
upon condition thereafter to be compiled
with by the purchaser; and (3) a sale "on
approval" or "on trial." where the purchas-
er has an option to buy if property meets
his satisfaction or approval.
2. Where goods are sold on trial or
approval or if satisfactory to the buyer.
property in the goods does not pass until
the buyer has expressly or impliedly man-
ifested his approval or acceptance.
3. Where A delivers his horse to B upon
the express agreement on the part of B
that if the horse suits him he will execute
to A his note with approved security, but
if the horse does not suit him he will re-
turn it, and thereafter A dies and the ad-
min'strator of his estate is appointed, and
then B, without having executed his note
to A or to such administrator, sells the
horse to C, title to the horse remains in
A. B acquires no title to the horse. passes
none to C, and the administrator may main-
tain replevin to recover the horse.
1. The transaction between A and B is
a sale "on approval"--it is a conditional
sale on approval, and the only option B
has under his agreement with A is the op-
tion to buy by executing his note with ap-
proved security to A or the administrator,
and he can manifest his apnroval or ac-
centance of the horse in no other way.
5. Instructions in the record correctly
stating the law as here outlined.
Action in replevin by the appellee,
John D. Carson as administrator of
the estate of Ray Stevens, deceased,
against the appellants, Charles D.
Simpson and Edward Williams.
From a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendants appeal.Affired
A/r n?' ed.
Clarence R. Smith and William A.
Miner for Appellants.
Edward J. Dundon and John J.
Killilea for appellees.
VURPILLAT, J. The appellee,
John D. Carron, as the duly appoint-
ed, qualified and acting administra-
tor of the estate of Ray Stevens, de-
ceased, filed complaint in one para-
graph in the action of replevin,
against the appellants, Charles D.
Simpson and Edward Williams, al-
leging that, as such administrator,
he was the owner and entitled to the
immediate possession of a certain
described horse, and that the appel-
lants were unlawfully detaining the
same. The case was submitted to a
jury for trial upon the separate an-
.swers in general denial of the de-
fendants, and a verdict was returned
by the jury stating the plaintiff, ap-
pellee was the owner of the horse
therein described, and entitled to the
immediate possession thereof. Sep-
arate motions of the defendants for
judgment non obstante verdicto and
for a new trial were overruled and
Judgment entered on the verdict for
the plaintiff.
The assignments of error relied on
for reversal of the judgment are that
the judgment is contrary to the law
and the evidence, and that the trial
court erred in overruling the separ-
ate motions for judgment non ob-
stante veredicto and for a new trial.
The facts of the case as disclosed
by the record and confirmed by the
verdict of the jury are that Ray
Stevens, appellee's intestate, agreed
to sell to Charles D. Simpson "on ap-
proval" the horse in controversy. As
conceded by appellants in their
briefs, "the understanding was that
Simpson was to take the horse and
try him, and if the horse should suit
him, give Stevens his note with ap-
proved security; but if the horse
should not suit him, he was to return
the horse to Stevens." Pursuant to
this agreement Stevens delivered the
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horse to Simpson. Some time there-
after Stevens died, and in due course
the appellee was appointed and qual-
ified as the administrator of his es-
tate. Thereafter, the appellant,
Simpson, without having executed
his note with approved security as
agreed, and without having done any-
thing whatever to indicate his ac-
ceptance or approval of the horse de-
livered to him by Simpson, sold and
transferred the horse to his co-appel-
lant, Edward Williams. And at the
time of the commencement of this ac-
tion the appellant, Simpson, had not
executed or offered to execute his
note as agreed, and neither Simpson
nor Williams, at the commencement
of this action, had done or said any-
thing whatever to indicate approval
or acceptance of the horse in accord-
ance with Stevens' contract to sell,
unless the mere sale and transfer of
the horse from Simpson to Williams
without the knowledge or consent of
Stevens or the administrator of his
estate constituted such approval and
acceptance.
Upon this state of facts appellants
contend that Simpson became the
owner of the horse and passed title
to Williams, and that plaintiff, ap-
pellee, therefore cannot maintain this
action to recover the horse. Appel-
lants not only contend that the judg-
ment is contrary to law, but that in-
structions Nos. seven and eight giv-
en to the jury by the trial court
as the law of the case were
erroneous, and that for the giving of
either of such instructions it was er-
ror to overrule the motion for a new
trial.
The instructions are in the record,
and if numbers seven and eight com-
plained of together with number six
related thereto, correctly state the
law applicable to the facts of the case,
then the judgment must be affirmed,
otherwise the appeal must be sus-
tained. These instructions are as fol-
lows:
Instruction 6. Jf the jury find that
the decedent, Ray Stephens, and the
defendant, Charles D. Simpson, en-
tered into negotiations for the sale
and transfer of the horse in question,
and that it was agreed by and be-
tween them that the defendant might
purchase the horse upon the condi-
tion that he give to the decedent at
some future time his promissory note
for the horse in the sum agreed up-
on, and that the decedent delivered
the horse upon that express cindition,
then the court instructs you, such
transaction was a conditional sale, and
as such did not pass title in the horse
to the defendant, Simpson, until such
condition was complied with, until
said defendant executed and deliv-
ered to the deceased or his personal
representative in this case the prom-
issory note to be given.
Instruction 7. If the jury find
that the deceased, Ray Stephens, and
the defendant, Charles D. Simpson,
entered into negotiations by which it
was agreed between them that said
Simpson was to take the horse of
plaintiff on approval-that is, was
to take the horse with a view to pur-
chase, and if the horse proved satis-
factory to defendant, Simpson, said
defendant was then to execute and
deliver to Stephens his promissory
note in the sum agreed upon, and if
the horse did not prove satisfactory
to defendant, Simpson. then defend-
ant was to return the horse to Steph-
ens, then and in that state of facts,
the court instructs you the transac-
tion constitutes a sale on approval,
and such sale does not pass title to
the defendant, Simpson, until such
approval of the horse is actually
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made and indicated by said defend-
ant by the execution and delivery of
his promissory note as agreed upon.
Instruction 8. If the jury find
,upon the foregoing instructions that
the negotiation and transaction was
either a conditional sale or a sale on
approval, and that the condition was
not complied with; or that the ap-
proval of the horse for purchase was
note made by the execution and de-
livery of the note, then, and in either
of said events, title to the horse did
not pass from the deceased to de-
fendant, Simpson. And if the jury
further find that defendant Simpson,
without complying with the condi-
tion of executing and delivering his
promissory note, if a conditional
sale, or without indicating his ap-
proval of the horse for purchase and
sale, if a sale on approval, then said
defendant acquired no title by the
transaction and agreement with the
decedent, and the property remained
the property of the decedent and be-
came the property of the plaintiff as
administrator upon the death of
Stephens.
And if the jury further find that
said defendant, Simpson, in that
state of facts transferred said horse
to the co-defendant, Wiliams then
said co-defendant also did not acquire
title to the horse, and the horse re-
mained the property of the plain-
tiff as against both defendants.
And the court further instructs
the jury that such transfer of the
horse from defendant, Simpson, to
defendant, Williams, was a tortious
conversion of the .property of the
plaintiff for which repleVin may be
maintained, and in such case, if the
jury so find the facts from a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the plaintiff
is entitled to a verdict against the
defendants, whether a demand was
made for the return of the horse
prior to the bringing of the action or
not.
There are three transactions in-
volving sale which are executory in
character and do not of themselves
operate to transfer the title from
the owner or seller to the purchaser.
One of these is a bailment with the
option in the bailee to buy the prop-
erty. The transaction cannot be-
come a sale and pass title till the op-
tion is exercised. Cloke vs. Shaf-
roth, 137 Ill. 393-27 N. E. 702. 31 Am.
St. Rep. 375; Barnes vs. NeCrey, 75
Iowa, 267-39 N. 392-9 Am. St. Rep.
473; Chase vs. Washburn, I Ohio St.
244-59 Am. Dec. 623; State vs.
Stockmaan, 30 Oreg. 36-46 Pac. 851;
Dunlay vs. Gleason, 16 Mich. 158-93
Am. Dec. 231; Lyon vs. Lennon, 106
Ind. 567-7 N. E. 311. See 43 Cent.
Dig., "Sales," Sec. 11. Another is the
conditional sale, or tthe sale and de-
livery of property upon a stipulated
condition thereafter to be complied
with, as where a note or security in
payment of the price is to be given.
35 .Cyc. 326; 43 Cent. Dig., "Sales,"
Sec. 544; McCone vs. Eccles. (Nev.)
181 Pac. 134; Murray Co. vs. Satter-
field, (Ark.) 187 S. W. 927; Platter
vs Acker, 13 Ind. App. 417-41 N. E.
832; Admundson vs. Standard
Printing Co. 140 Iowa 464-118 N. W.
789; Bonham vs. Hamilton, 66 Ohio
St. 82-63 N. E. 597; Wise vs. Collins.
121 Cal. 147-53 Pac. 640. The third
is the so-called sale "on trial" or "on
approval." Where goods are sold on
trial or approval or if satisfactory to
the buyer, the property in the goods
does not pass until the buyer has ex-
pressly or impliedly manifested his
approval or acceptance. 43 Cent.
Dig., "Sales," Secs. 557-8; Note to
50 L. R. A. (NS) 808; 35 Syc, 289;
Mechem on Sales, Vol. 1, Sees. 657-
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659; 24 R. C. L. 39; Glascott vs. Haz-
el, (N. C.) 13 S. E. 789; Pierce vs.
Cooley, 56 Mich. 552-23 N. W. 310;
Gates Iron Works vs. Cohen, (Colo.)
43 Pac. 667; State vs. Betz, 207 Mo.
589-106 S. W. 64; Osborn vs. Francis
(W. Va.) 18 S. E. 591-45 Am. St.
Rep. 859; Mulcahy vs. Dieudohne,
103 Minn. 352-115 N. W. 636.
Appellants' case involves more
than a bailment with option to pur-
chase. A sale was immediately pro-
jected by the appellant, Simpson,
and the deceased, Stevens, by their
transaction, and the trial court,
therefore, correctly decided that such
transaction constituted a conditional
sale or a sale on approval, and ac-
cordingly instructed the jury. And
the instruction number eight com-
plained is correct in the statement of
the law that "If the jury further
find that defendant, Simpson, with-
out complying with the condition of
executing and delivering his promis-
sory note, if a conditional sale, or
without indicating his approval of
the horse for purchase, if a sale on
approval, then said defendant acquir-
ed no title by the transaction and
agreement with the decedent, and
the property remained the property
of the decedent, and became the prop-
erty of the plaintiff as administrator
upon the death of Stevens."
Appellants are relying upon the
proposition that in a case of sale on
approval, the acceptance and approv-
al to pass title in the goods may be
implied from the conduct of the buy-
er, and they contend that the subse-
quent sale of the horse constituted
such conduct. They invoke the rule,
with the cases supporting it, that ac-
ceptance may be inferred from con-
duct of the buyer in treating goods in
a manner inconsistent with any oth-
er view than that he is the owner of
them, as where he sells or mortgages
the goods to a third person after
their receipt. This is the rule for de-
termining what constitutes a suffi-
cient constructive delivery and ac-
ceptance of goods to take a contract
of sale out of the operation of the
statute of frauds, and enable the sel-
ler to enforce such contract against
the buyer. 20 Cyc. 247. The rule
has no application for determining
what constitutes "approval" in a sale
''on approval." Not one of the cases
involves such a sale, and such cases
are therefore not in point. The case
of Beedy vs. Brawman, Wooden
Ware Co., (Me.) 79 Atl. 721, stressed
by appellant, is such a case.
The buyer's manifestation of ap-
proval must be made and determined
in terms of the agreement, and not
by the arbitrary and independent
conduct of the buyer himself. Thus
where, by the terms of the agree-
ment, an article is sold on thirty days
trial, and is to be returned if not sat-
isfactory, time is of the essence of
the contract, and where the article is
retained by the purchaser without
complaint beyond the prescribed
time, the sale becomes absolute and
the purchaser liable to an action for
the purchase price. O'Donnell vs.
Wing & Son, 121 Ga. 717-49 S. E.
720; Dewey vs. Erie, 14 Pa. 211-53
Om. Dec. 533; International Filter
Co., vs. Cox Bottling Co., 89 Kan.
645-132 Pac. 180; Hiltgen vs. Viever,
162 Wis. 315-156 N. W. 132: Buck-
eye Tractor Ditcher vs. Smith, 158
Iowa, 104-138 N. W. 817; Wolf Co.
vs. Monarch Refrigerator Co. 252 Ill.
491-96 N. E. 1063-50 L. R. A. (NS)
808 and note. Where no time is stip-
ulated for the trial or approval, the
same result follows a purchaser's
failure to return the article within a
reasonable time after trial. Under-
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wood vs. Wolf, .131 Ill. 425-23 N. E.
598-19 Am. St. Rep. 40; Pa. Iron
Works vs. Hygeian Ice Co., 185 Mass.
366-70 N. E. 427; Watts vs. Natl.
Cash Reg. Co., 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1347-
78 S. W. 118; Bostian vs. DeLaval
Separator Co., 92 Md. 483-48 Atl. 75;
Gurney vs Collins, 64 Mich. 458 31
N. W. 429.
It is held, however, that retention
beyond the specified or reasonable
time for approval of the purchased
article, makes the sale absolute only
if the seller so. elects. The mere
failure to return the property or re-
fusal to "accept, or comply with the
terms of sale agreed upon, cannot of
itself operate to divest the seller of
his title and transfer such title to the
delinquent purchaser. Bradford Co.
vs. United Leather Co., (Del. Ch.)
97 Atl. 620; Warren et al. vs. Rus-
sell (Ark.) 220 S. W. 831. In the
first of these cases, upon the inter-
vening petition of the Turner Tan-
ning Machinery Co., to reclaim ma-
chinery placed on trial and kept by
the purchaser till he went into bank-
ruptcy, two years later, the Chan-
cery Court held that "the seller could
either resume possession of the ma-
chine, and so disaffirm the sale, or
sue for the price, and so affirm it."
The Chancellor says: "Particularly
is this true where, as here, there was
no limit of time within which the
buyer could make the trial. As the
counsel for the seller contended, the
buyer never having definitely accept-
ed the machine, and the seller never
having limited the time within which
the trial could be made, continued
use of the machine even for nearly
two years, could not be construed as
an acceptance, and the seller could as
against the buyer have chosen to ter-
minate the trial and enforce by re-
plevin a return of the property. This
right he has against the receiver."
Continuing, the Chancellor says:
"In support of this is the case of In
re George M. Hill Co., 123 Fed. 866-
59 C. C. A. 354, where a machine sold
on trial was used by the buyer until
it became bankrupt and with contin-
ued refusals to accept, or pay for the
machine. When the buyer was ad-
judicated a bankrupt, the seller
sought to reclaim the machine. It
was held that there was no accept-
ance which under the contract was
essential to constitute a completed
sale to divest the title of the seller,
and the (buyer) having refused to
accept till bankruptcy, whether, or
not, the refusal was justified or
made in bad faith, neither the bank-
rupt nor its trustee, could claim an
acceptance as a basis of reclamation
of the machine. Applying this prin-
ciple here, there never was an ac-
ceptance of the machine on the part
of the buyer and the seller continued
to the end to regard it still on trial,
which means that it had not been
accepted. Though the seller might
have regarded the detention and use
as unreasonable and chosen to regard
it as an acceptance, it may not chose
to do so, and it remains unaccepted
so far as the seller is concerned. The
buyer cannot by his unreasonable de-
tention acquire against the will of
the seller a right to the goods sold
on trial. The seller may acquire a
right against the buyer by the deten-
tion, but not the buyer against the
seller. This is both a reasonable and
just principle. Title did not, there-
fore, pass to the buyer, even if there
had been an agreement as to the
prices."
One case seems to lend support to
appellants' contention that the sub-
sequent sale by Simpson to the co-
defendant, Williams, constituted ap-
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proval and passed title. This is the
case of O'Donnell vs. Wing & Son,
121 Ga. 717-49 S. E. 720. After
holding that "by retaining the in-
strument beyond the time limited,
Jones, by his conduct, expressed such
satisfaction as to make the sale abso-
lute and entitle the seller to bring
action for the price," the court says:
"In addition to retaining the piano,
it appears that Jones sold it to the
defendant. There are cases which
hold that under shipments on trial
order the fact that the article so re-
ceived is sold to a third person is it-
self such an expression of satisfac-
tion as to complete the sale. (If the
seller so elects, we say) Title then
passes from the seller to him who
has obtained possession under a trial
order with the right to purchase on
given terms if the property proves
satisfactory." Although the Court
says there are "cases" which so hold,
only one is cited, namely: Delamater
vs. Chappell, 48 Md. 253. We do not
have access to this case. It is not
reported in the Selected Case System
of Reports. Corpus Juris recog-
nizes it merely as supporting the
proposition that "The failure of the
buyer to exercise the option within
a reasonable time, the article being
retained, is equivalent to an accept-
ance." 35 Cyc. 236-237. And this is
all that the main case itself is recog-
nized as authority for holding. 35
Cyc. 290, e, 15. In fact the state-
ment above quoted is nowhere, in
case or text, adopted or recognized as
the law. The general authoriities re-
ferred to by the court, following the
statement, presumably as support-
ing it, give it no support, and anoth-
er case referred to, the case of Furst
vs Commercial Bank, 117 Ga. 472-
43 S. E. 728, is acctually contra. The
statement was wholly unnecessary
to the decision, which had already
been declared on the other proposi-
tion, and we regard it as obiter dicta.
That sale to a third person by one
to whom property is sold on approv-
al passes no title to such third per-
son before the original sale has be-
come absolute by manifestation on
the part of the original buyer of his
approval and acceptance of the prop-
erty in the terms of the agreement
is supported by the following cases:
Warren et al, vs. Russell, (Ark.) 220
S. W. 831; Glasscock vs. Hazell, (N.
C.) 13 S. E. 789; Crocker vs. Gulli-
fer, 44 Me. 491-69 Am. Dec. 118;
James Bradford Co., vs. United
Leather Co., 97 Atl. 620; Gates Iron
Works vs. Cohen, (Colo.) 43 Pac.
667.
As said by the court in Osborn vs.
Francis, 38 W. Va. 312- 45 Am. St.
Rep. 859-862, "If it is a sale on trial
(or approval) it is said to be a sale
on condition precedent-to buy if
satisfied; that is the title does not
pass until the condition prescribed is
fully performed, although the pos-
session is delivered, being rather a
bailment with option to buy than a
sale." The appellant, Simpson, hav-
ing failed to expressly or impliedly
manifest his approval or acceptance
of the horse, and the appellee not
having waived his right thereto, this
condition precedent was not com-
plied with, and Simpson therefore
acquired no title to the horse.
But there is yet another condition
precedent in this case to the passing
of title to Simpson, and that is the
giving of his note with approved se-
curity as expressly agreed by him.
His transaction with the decedent,
Stevens, was a conditional sale on ap-
proval. Mowbray vs. Cady, 40 Iowa,
Glasscock vs. Hazel, (N. C.) 13 S. E.
789. After the first condition, that
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is manifesting approval of the horse
was complied with, there remained
the second condition precedent, the
giving of his note with approved se-
curity as agreed which was also es-
sential to the passing of the title. 35
Cyc. 281 and 326; 43 Cent. Dig.,
"Sales," 543; Kutz, vs. Hart, 17 Ind.
329; Platter vs. Acker, 13 Ind. App.
417-41 N. E. 832; Millhiser vs. Erd-
man, (N. C.) 3 S. E. 521-2 Am. St.
Rep. 334; Wise vs. Collins, 121 Cal.
147-53 Pac. 640; Wiggens vs. Snow,
89 Mich. 476-50 N. W. 991; The
Drug Co., vs. Teasdall, (Neb.) 72 N.
W. 1028. In the case of Glasscock vs
Hazell, (N. C.) supra, the court
says: "The authoritieg cited by the
defendant do not satisfy us that the
plaintiff was precluded from assert-
ing title to the property. The plain-
tiff testified that Hill & Holden did
not buy the wheel, but that it was
delivered to them upon the under-
standing that they might purchase,
after testing it, upon laying $50
cash, and securing the balance. These
terms do not seem to have been com-
plied with, and we do not see, under
these circumstances, how the title
passed out of the plaintiff." In that
case a statute was involved making
conditional sales void. In appel-
lants' case no such statute applied.
It is repugnant to right reason and
the sense of justice that appellants
should be permitted to ignore and
violate the express terms of the
agreement with the deceased, Stev-
ens, and that appellant, Simpson,
should be permitted to sell the horse
and convert the proceeds of the sale
to his own use, and deny to the dece-
dent's estate, both the horse and the
note. The sale from Simpson to
Williams not only did not pass title,
but it constituted such a tortious
conversion of the property as gave
to the appellee the right to recover
in this action without demand for
the return of the property. Crocker
vs. Gullifer, (Me.) 69 Am. Dec. 118
and note; Warren et al. vs. Russell,
(Ark.) 220 S. W. 831. In the latter
case the court, in approving an in-
struction similar to the one here
complained of, said: "The effect of
the instruction was to tell the jury
that, in the event it found that the
sale was on trial, the title to the
property did not pass, and that it
was the duty of the jury to find for
the plaintiff against the defendant,
Warren, (third person.) In
the present case there was no testi-
mony tending to show that the buyer
offered to return the horse, or that
the seller waived his right to treat
the sale as executory and to declare
it an absolute one. The only dis-
puted question of fact in the case was
whether or not the sale of the horse
was an absolute one, or a sale on
trial. If the testimony of the plain-
tiff was true, and it was practically
undisputed, the title to the horse did
not pass out of Doyle to Earl Morton,
and Warren, who traded for the
horse, acquired no other or greater
title than Morton. It follows the
judgment must be affirmed."
The court's instructions correctly
stated the law of the case, the judg-
ment is not contrary to the law and
the evidence; there is no error in the
record, and the judgment is there-
fore in all things affirmed.
CARPER vs. WHITCOMB, by Next Fiiend
No. 14
Infant's Contract-Executed-Purchase
Price Recovered-Consideration not Re-
turned, Disposed of and Lost by Infant-
Fraudulent Representations as to Age--Is-
sues on Pleading-Instructions in Record
Approved.
1. Where the infant, upon his arrival at
majority, or at the time he seeks disaffirm-
ance, still has the consideration received
or any part thereof, he must, upon his dis-
affirmance, return it, for the law will not
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allow him to repudiate his contract and at
the same time retain its fruits as his own;
but where he has disposed of, lost or wast-
ed the same during his infancy his right to
disaffirm is in no way dependent upon his
making good to the other party what he
received. 22 Cyc. 614.
2. Even though the infant by his fraud-
ulent representations as to his age induces
the other party to enter into the contract,
such infant may nevertheless recover what
he has paid under the contract if he re-
turns or offers to return the consideration
received by him; and an instruction to that
effect is erroneous as against the other
party to the contract.
3. Instructions stating the law of the
case approved.
Civil action by appellee to recover
two hundred dollars consideration
paid to appellant on a contract exe-
cuted by appellee as an infant. From
a judgment in favor of appellee,
plaintiff, the defendant, Carper, ap-
peals. Affirmed.
Thos. Spencer McCabe and John F.
Heffernan for appellant.
Arthur C. Keeney and Harry E.
Denny for appellee.
VURPILLAT, J. The appellant
prosecutes this appeal upon the fol-
lowing assignment of errors: (1)
the judgment is contrary to the law
and the evidence; (2) sustaining ap-
pellee's demurrer to the third para-
graph of answer; (3) refusing to
give to the jury appellant's tendered
instruction number five; (4) over-
ruling the motion for a venire de
,nove; (5) overruling the motion for
a new trial. The fourth assignment
is waived for failure of appellant to
present or discuss it in his briefs.
This appeal must be determined
largely upon a consideration of the
trial court's instructions, which are
in the record; and, since these in-
structions so fully, set forth the facts
of the case and the issues presented
by the pleadings, as well as the law
of the case as applied by the court on
the trial, we quote in full those in-
structions material to this appeal,
to-wit:
Instruction No. 3. Plaintiff in his
complaint, for cause of action against
the defendant, alleges that the plain-
tiff is an infant under the age of
twenty-one years, and that he bought
from the defendant on or about the
15th day of October, 1920, one horse,
one buggy ind one set of harness,
for which plaintiff paid the defend-
ant $200; that at the time of such
purchase plaintiff worked as a day
laborer; that the articles purchased
were used for pleasure riding only
and were bought for that purpose.
Plaintiff further alleges that he sold
the harness and buggy, and that the
horse was condemned as unfit for
use; that plaintiff is not in possession
of any of the articles of purchase,
nor has he any part of the proceeds
of the sale of the harness and buggy.
Plaintiff demands a recission of the
contract of purchase made with the
defendant and demands judgment
ment for $200, the purchase money
on said contract paid to the defend-
ant.
To this complaint defendant an-
swers first by denying all the allega-
tions of fact made by plaintiff; sec-
ond by confessing plaintiff's action
but avoiding liability on the allega-
tions that plaintiff purchased the ar-
ticles mentioned in complaint for the
use of himself and wife and family
and that they were articles of ne-
cessity; and third, that to induce de-
fendant to sell said articles the plain-
tiff falsely represented to defendant
that he was twenty-one years of age;
that plaintiff was at the time a full
grown man with beard and mous-
tache and having the appearances of
an adult; that defendant had no
means of knowing the facts and re-
lied on the representations of the
plaintiff; that plaintiff has not re-
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turned or offered to return the arti-
cles purchased or any of them.
To the special facts alleged by de-
fendant as a defence to the action
plaintiff files reply in general denial.
Instruction No. 4. On these issues
as stated the court instructs you that
the plaintiff has the burden of es-
tablishing the facts of his complaint
by a preponderance of the evidence;
that evidence, which, after consider-
ing all the evidence in the case intro-
duced by both the plaintiff and de-
fendant, most satisfactorily tends to
prove to the jury the existence or
non existance of the facts upon which
plaintiff relies for recovery. The
theory of plaintiff's right of recovery
in this action is that he was a minor
at the time he purchased the articles
as alleged and that, therefore, he is
liable for the purchase price under
the contract only at his option; that,
having decided to exercise his option
not to recognize the contract, but to
rescind the same, he is entitled to re-
cover the $200 alleged to have been
paid to defendant under said con-
tract. On this branch of the case the
court instructs you that it is a gen-
eral rule of law that an infant-that
is a person under the age of twenty-
one years- is liable on his simple
contracts, such as this, only at his
own option, and may avoid such lia-
bility and rescind such contract.
Instruction No. 5. And the court
instructs you that as a general rule
of law an infant may rescind his sim-
ple contract and recover back such
money or property as he has parted
with thereunder. The court instructs
you that where such contract is an
oxecuted one, and the infant plain-
tiff has the consideration passed to
him, he should return or offer to re-
tuirn the same if within his power to
do so; but that, if he has not the con-
sideration which he received, even
though he may have wasted or lost
the same, then he is entitled to recov-
er without having returned or offered
to return the consideration received
by him. Plaintiff alleges that he did
not have the articles at the time he
began his action; that the horse had
been taken and condemned, and that
the harness and buggy had been sold
and that he also did not have the pro-
ceeds of such sale. If you find by a
pre ponderance these facts and the
other facts alleged by plaintiff, then
your verdict should be for the plain-
tiff in such sum as the evidence
shows the real purchase price to be
which plaintiff paid to defendant;
unless you should find the facts to be
as alleged by defendant in either his
second or third paragraphs of an-
swer.
Instruction No. 6: Defendant
first alleges that the articles purchas-
ed by the plaintiff were necessaries
for the use of plaintiff and his fami-
ly. On this issue the defendant has
the burden of proving such facts by
a preponderance of the evidence in
the case. Necessities or necessaries
are such things as are reasonably re-
quired for the board, lodging, educa-
tion, clothing and sustainance of the
infant according to h is status or con-
dition in life and sociey. And if the
infant is a married man, as alleged
in this case, then the requirements
for the support of the family and all
the members thereof must be consid-
ered as necessities along with those
of the infant himself. The court in-
structs you that a horse, buggy and
harness may or may not be consider-
ed a necessity, depending upon the
means of livlihood, the mode of liv-
ing, the conditions and demands for
the use of such articles, those for
whose use they may be required,
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whether needed for actual use in the
living conditions of the minor and his
family or whether constituting a
mere pleasure and apparently serv-
ing no other purpose. The court in-
structs you that it is a question of
fact whether the horse, buggy and
harness contracted for in this case
were or were not necessaries in the
situation and conditions of the plain-
tiff, as a minor, and is therefore for
the jury to determine from a care-
ful consideration of all the evidence
in the case, that introduced as well
by the plaintiff as by the defendant.
Instruction No. 7. The court in-
structs you that if you should find
from a preponderance of the evidence
in the case that the articles in ques-
tion were procured by the fraudulent
or false representations of the plain-
tiff as to his age made for the pur-
pose of so procuring them, and that
the defendant had no knowledge of
such fact of plaintiff's infancy but
relied upon the false statements of
the plaintiff in entering into the con-
tract, then before the plaintiff could
recover he would have to return or
offer to return the property received
under the contract, and if you find
that such false representations were
made and relied upon by defendant
as alleged, and you further find that
plaintiff did not return or offer to re-
turn the horse, buggy and harness,
then plaintiff would be barred in this
action because, although he may re-
scind his infancy contract and re-
cover his consideration, he may not
do so in a case where, as alleged by
defendant, the infant procured such
consideration by fraud, for in this
case the consideration must be re-
turned or offered to be returned be-
fore he can avoid or rescind such in-
fancy contract. If, however, the de-
fendant has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the
false representations of the plaintiff
alleged as a defence, then plaintiff is
entitled to recover whether he re-
turned or offered to return the prop-
erty or not, provided you find as al-
leged by plaintiff that he did not
have and does not now have the prop-
erty, as you have heretofore been in-
structed.
By the fifth of appellant's instruc-
tions, refused by the court, the court
was requested to instruct the jury
that "If you find that plaintiff mis-
represented his age to the defendant,
thereby inducing defendant to con-
tract with him, then the verdict
should be for the defendant." This
instruction was properly refused for
four reasons. (1) It does not state
the facts constituting the elements
of fraud' which the jury must find,
namely, that plaintiff falsely stated
the fact of his age, with an actual or
imputed knowledge that it was false,
with intention to deceive the defend-
ant, and that defendant relied and
had reason to rely on such state-
ments, and was thereby deceived and
induced to enter into the contract
with plaintiff. As to these elements
of fraud, see Anson on Contracts
199; Chapin on Torts, 396 Eaton on
Equity 288; Cobby. vs. Buchannon,
48 Neb. 391-67 N. W. 176; Watkins
vs. Billings, (Ark.) 42 Am. Rep. 1;
Putnal vs. Walker, (Fla.) 55 So. 844-
36 L. R. A. (NS) 33 and note; Sewell
vs Sewall, 92 Ky. 500-18 S. W. 162-
36 Am. St. Rep. 606; Damron vs.
Com., 110 Ky. 268-61 S. W. 459-96
Am. St. Rep. 453; Note to 18 Am.
St. Rep. 636. (2) The law does not
preclude or estop an infant from
avoiding or disaffirming his contract
on the ground of his fraudulent rep-
resentation that he was of age when
entering into such contract. 22 Cyc.
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611; 27 Cent. Dig., "Infants," Sec.
100; 14 R. C. L. 241, Sec. 22; Anno-
tation, 6 A. L. R. 416; Burdette vs.
Williams, 30 Fed. 697; Raymond
Motorcycle Co. vs. Adams, 230 Mass.
54-119 N. E. 359; Laundry Co. vs.
Adams, (Ky.) 208 S. W. 68; Wie-
land vs. Kobic, 110 Ill. 16-51 Am.
Rep. 676; Book Co. vs. Connelly, 206
N. Y. 188-99 N. E. 722-42 L. R. A.
(NS) 1115; Ridgway vs. Herbert,
150 Mo. 606-51 S. W. 1040-73 Am.
St. Rep. 464; Tobin vs. Spann,
(Ark.) 109 S. W. 534-16 L. R. A.
(NS) 672; Carpenter vs. Carpenter,
45 Ind. 142; Price vs. Jennings, 62
Ind. 111; Conrad vs. Lane, 26 Minn.
389-4 N. W. 695-37 Anm St. Rep.
412; Whitcomb vs. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79-
31 Am. Rep. 678. In some states
the infant is estopped by statute. De-
cisions applying such statutes are
not in point here. Nor are those de-
cisions in point which deny the in-
fant relief in equity for violating
two maxims in seeking equity with
unclean hands and without doing
equity. (3) the tendered instruction
was properly refused because the
proposition of law applicable to the
case was correctly stated to the jury
in instruction number seven, sura.
Indeed, the trial court's instruction
is more favorable to appellant than
some courts are willing to approve,
in that the infant's right to recover
from appellant was stated to be upon
condition that the infant or offer to
return the property received by him.
(4) the issue whether or not the ap-
pellee made fraudulent representa-i
tions as to his age and thereby in-
duced the appellant to make the con-
tract was clearly presented to the
jury by the trial court's instructions,
particularly number seven, and was
decided adversely to appellant. The
jury having, found -no fraud on ap-
pellee's part, the instruction refused
would have had no application, and
the refusal to give such instruction
was therefore harmless.
There was no error in sustaining
plaintiff's demurrer to the appellant's
answer that the plaintiff had not re-
turned or offered to return the prop-
erty or consideration received for the
purchase money sought to be recov-
ered by the plaintiff. These facts
constitute no bar to plaintiff's cause
of action. We think the trial court's
exposition of the law on this branch
of the case was clearly and correct-
ly stated. In support thereof we are
content to rely on the statement con-
tained in Sec. 5 of 22 Cyc. 614, as fol-
lows: "Where the infant, upon his ar-
rival at majority, or at the time he
seeks disaffirmance, still has the con-
sideration received or any part there-
of, he must, upon his disaffirmance,
return it, for the law will not allow
him to repudiate his contract and at
the same time retain its fruits as his
own; but where he has disposed of,,
lost or wasted the same during his
infancy his right to disaffirm is in no
way dependent upon his making
good to the other party what he re-
ceived, for the privelege of repudiat-
ing the contract is accorded to an in-
fant because of the. indiscretion in-
cident to his immaturity; and if he
were required to restore an equiva-
lent where he has wasted or squan-
dered the property or consideration
received, the privilege of repudiat-
ing would be of no avail when most
needed. There have been distinc-
tions attempted to be made between
executory and executed contracts and
between seeking relief at law and in
equity, but with only a few exceptions
the rule stated has governed the de-
cision regardless of the facts relied
on as distinguishing." See also 14
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
R. C. L. 238, Sec. 20; 27 Cent. Dig.,
"Infants," Sec. 157. The following
are some recent cases sustaining this
statement of the law: Perelson vs.
Podolsky, 191 Ill. App. 589; Waller
vs. Chuse Grocery Co., 241 Ill. 398-
89 N. E. 796-132 Am. St. Rep. 216
and note,- 28 L. R. A. (NS) 128;
Bank vs. Casey, 158 Iowa 349-138 N.
W. 897; Gray vs. Grimm, 157 Ky.
603-163 S. W. 762; Barr vs. Carr Co.,
172 Mich. 299-137 N. W. 697; Chan-
dler vs. Jones (N. C.) 90 S. E. 580;
Lambrecht vs. Holsaple, 164 Wis.
465-160 X. W. 168; Turner vs Ry.
Co., 127 Tenn. 673-156 S. W. 1085;
Fassett vs. Seip, 249 Pa. 576-95 Atl.
273; McGuckian vs. Carpenter, (R.
I.) 110 AtI. 402; McGraal vs. Taylor,
167 U. S. 688-17 Sup. Ct. 961-42 L.
Ed. 326; Blake vs. Harding (Utah)
180 Pac. 172.
Early decisions in some states
adopted the contrary rule here in-
voked by appellant. Some of these
decisions have been overruled, some
modified. Thus Bartleet vs. Cowles,
15 Gray (Mass.) 445 is expressly
overruled by the case of Bartlett vs.
Drake, 100 Mass. 174-97 Am. Dec.
92-I Am. Rep. 101, and the new rule
has been adhered to in recent deci-
sions. See McGuckian vs. Carpenter,
supra. Bingham vs. Barley, 55 Tex.
281-40 Am. Rep. 801, and other Tex-
as cases to the same effect are prac-
tically overruled in Bullock vs.
Sproules, 93 Tex. 188-54 S. W. 661-
78 Am. St. Rep. 849-47 L. R. A. 326.
The case of Taft vs. Pike, 14 Vt. 405-
39 Am. Dec. 228 and other cases are
clearly modified by the case of Price
vs. Furman. 27 Vt. 268-39 Am. Dec.
194. The great weight of authority
and the trend of modern decisions are
against the rule invoked by appel-
lant.
The doctrine stated in Reeve's Do-
mestic Relations pg. 254, Ch. 2, fol-
lowed by some courts, to the effect
that where the infant's contract was
clearly beneficial to him, the consid-
eration must be returned, can have
no application to appellant's case, for
here the infant's contract was decid-
edly detrimental to him and secured
him no benefits..
Three cases considered by us are
strikingly analagous in point of fact
to appellant's case, and all three are
adverse to appellant's appeal and
sustain the right of appellee to re-
cover. In Whitcomb vs. Joslyn, 51
Vt. 79-31 Am. Rep. 678, where an
infant by misrepresenting his age
bought a wagon, it was held that the
infant was not estopped to avoid his
contract and recover the money paid.
In McGuckian vs. Carpenter (R. I.)
110 Atl. 402, the infant's fraud was
not an issue, but recovery of the pur-
chase price of a wagon, horse and
harness was sustained where the in-
fant had disposed of the wagon and
harness and the horse had become
worthless. In White vs. Branch, 51
Ind. 210, where the horse purchased
by the infant had become of no value,
return was held unnecessary to the
right of recovery.
The trial court's instructions cor-
rectly state the law of the case, and
the judgment is thherefore not con-
trary to the law. The verdict is am-
ply supported by the evidence and
the motion for new triial was prop-
erly overruled. There is no error in
the record and the judgment is af-
firmed.
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In the Notre Dame Supreme Court
Marshall Carper, appellant,
VS.
James Whitcomb, by next friend, ap-
pellee.
Brief for appellant.
1. NATURE OF THE ACTION
This was an action brQught by
James Whitcomb an infant altho
married and father of a child: The
plaintiff, represented in the action
by his next friend, Thomas Rees,
seeks to rescind a contract entered
into with one Marshall Carper, in
which Whitcomb purchased for a
consideration of two hundred dollars
a horse, a buggy and a set of harness.
Prior to the bringing of the action
the plaintiff has disposed of the
buggy andf harness and the horse
has been condemned by the officers
of the Humane Society. Plaintiff
asks for a return of the consideration
paid by him to the defendant in the
sum of two hundred dollars.
2. ISSUES PRESENTED
The plaintiff filed a complaint in
two paragraphs alleging fraud in the
first as a ground for recision and in-
fancy in the second. The defendant
demurred separately and severally
to the complaint and the demurrer
to the first paragraph was sustained
and to the second paragraph over-
ruled. The plaintiff's cause then
went to trial on the single paragraph
of complaint alleging infancy. The
defendant filed an answer in five
paragraphs viz: 1st, A general de-
nial; 2nd, Confession and Avoidance,
alleging that the articles in question
were proper items of family expense;
3rd, confession and avoidance, claim-
ing that a return of consideration
was a prerequisite to avoidance of an
infant contract; 4th, Estoppel, al-
leging that plaintiff had made false
representation, in regard to his age
and thus induced defendant to con-
tract with him; 5th, Set-off, alleging
that the depreciation of the articles
in question by reason of plaintiff's
use and misuse of them and the value
of Lhe benefit he received from them
bhould be deducted from the sum ask-
ed by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's demurrers to para-
graphs three and five of the answer
were sustained and accordingly. those
paragraphs were stricken out of the
answer. Trial was had by jury and
a verdict of two hundred dollars fo,
the plaintiff was returned by then,.
Before judgment was entered the de-
fendant made motion for a venire do
novo which the court overruled. De-
fendant then filed a motion for a new
.rial which motion the court also
overruled whereupon the defendant
prays for an appeal which is grant-
ed. The defendant then filed aa a -
peal bond with approved sureties and
also filed a bill of exceptions.
3. ERRORS RELIED ON FOR
REVERSAL
1. The judgment is contrary to
the law and evidence.
2. The court erred in refusing to
give to the jury defendants instruc-
tion numbered five.
3. The court erred in ove,'"ui:g
appellants motion for a venire (1o
novo.
4. The court erred in overruling
appellants motion for a new trial.
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SYNOPSIS OF THE EVIDENCE
The plaintiff took the stand and
his testimony was substantially as
follows: That he was a minor, mar-
ried and the father of one child; that
he !'ought the horse, harness and
bugg from the defendant for a con-
,idoration of two hundred dollars;
that the horse was found to be of lit-
tle or no use; that he sold the har-
ness and buggy: that his sole income
was his wages earned as a day lab-
orer; that he had neither horse har-
ness nor buggy at the time the action
was begun. In corroboration of this
evidence the plaintiff introduced Mr.
Edward Dundbn, who said that he
purchased the. buggy and harness in
question; Mr., Fred Dressel, an al-
leged officer of the Humane Society
who had- taken the horse into cus-
tody; Mr. Marcus Healy, who testi-
fied that he treated the horse for
heaves prior to its seizure by the offi-
cers; Mr. James Murphy, who testi-
fied that the plaintiff, James Whit-
comb, worked for him as a day lab-
orer at the rate of twenty dollars
per week.
The defendant's case consisted
substantially in showing thru the
testimony of Marshall Ca 'per de-
fendant, that the sale had been cul-
minated only after the plaintiff's
representations of majority, upon
which he relied and acted. Other
evidence brought out by Messrs.
Brady, Hughes and Foley adduced
the fact that the plaintiff had grossly
abused and mistreated the horse, that
he still had it in his possession. These
gentlemen together with Mr. James
' haw set forth evidence establishing
the plaintiff to be a man of moder-
ately wealthy circumstances with an
income independent of his wages.
The testimony of Mr. C. B. Foley, the
only duly qualified horse expert in-
troduced during the trial, showed
the horse to be in perfect condition
at the time of the sale by defendant
to plaintiff.
5. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
The important points involved in
the decision in this case may be sum-
marized as follows:
1. The triaal court should have
-iven defendant's instruction No. 5
!o the jury.
Commander vs. Brazile, 9 L.R.A.
N.S. 1117.
International Land Co. vs. Mar-
shall, 19 L.R.A. N. S. 1056.
County Board of Educators vs.
Hensley, 42 L.R.A. N.S. 643.
2. The plaintiff's failure to re-
turn or offer to return any of the
2onsideration should have been avail-
able as a defense to the defendant
hence the court below erred in sus-
taining plaintiff's demurrer to third
paragraph of answer.
Ruling Case Law, Vol. 14, page 240
Parson's Contracts, Vol. 1, page
347.
Reeves Domestic Relations, Chap.
2, page 254.
Taft vs. Pike, 39 Am. Dec. 228.
Hall vs. Butterfield, 47 Am. Rep.
209.
Engleberg vs. Pritchet, 26 L.R.A.
177.
Johnson vs. Northwestern Mutual
Ins. Co., 26 L.R.A. 187.
Craig vs. Van Beboee, 100 Mo. 584
Riley vs. Mallory, 33 Conn. 206.
Shurtleff vs. Millard, 34 Am. Rep.
640.
Valentine vs. Canali, L.R. 24 Q.B.
Div. 166.
6. ARGUMENT
The counsel for the appellant be-
Lieves firmly that there are a number
of errors in the judgment rendered
in this case below, any of which are
sufficient to sustain a reversal but
for various causes we shall here dis-
cuss, analyze and consider only two
of the many outstanding features
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which make this case reversible.
They are, first: the refusal to give
defendant's instruction numbered
five, and secondly the sustaining of
the defendant's demurrer to the de-
fendant's third paragraph of ans-
wer.
The instruction in question mere-
ly stated that if the plaintiff had mis-
represented his age to the defendant
thereby inducing the defendant to
contract with him then the judg-
ment must be for the defendant.
Clearly this is a well founded state-
ment of the law in this case. It has
long been the rule that the doctrine
of estoppel is applicable to infants
who make false statements as to their
age thus inducing others to contract
with them.
In the decision of Commander vs.
Brazile, 9 L.A. N.S. 1117, the facts
are similar to those of the case at
bar. An infant in order to induce
another to enter into a contract with
him, made false assertions to the ef-
fect that he was of full age. It was
held that such infant was estopped
from disaffirmance of the contract.
In reading the opinion on this case
we find the following dictum:
"Infants are shielded from their
own improvidence and their con-
tracts as to them are of no force ex-
cept as to necessaries, but when a
minor whose appearance justifies be-
lief in such statement, induces a con-
tract which is reasonable by false as-
surance that he is of the age of ma-
jority, he should be and is estopped
to repudiate it and should be and is
compelled to carry it out or to fully
restore the status quo by returning
what he got or making compensation
if he has wasted it."
Can the learned court refuse a re-
versal in the face of such a decision?
This is not an isolated case as there
are others to the same effect. In the
case of The International Land Co.,
vs. Marshal, 19 L.R.A. N.S. 1065,
where a minor had represented him-
self as being of age in entering a con-
tract and later sought to have it set
aside, it was held that such a person
may disaffirm only by restoring the
status quo. If this can not be done
then no disaffirmance may take
place. Of like import is the case of
the County Board of Education vs.
Hensley, 42 L.R.A. N.S. 643. These
decisions are by no means extra-
ordinary or far fetched. They simp-
ly state the only logical and common
sensible solution to the question in-
volved. Surely this court shall not
do otherwise than follow these uni-
versally accepted rulings.
The second question here to be
considered is nothing more nor less
than that of the necessity for restor-
ing the other party to status quo be-
fore recovery may be had by the in-
fant. On this point there is such an
unlimited abundance of authority
and decisions in appellant's favor
that it is difficult indeed to select the
ones most applicable. We shall first
consider a statement laid down al-
most a century ago and widely ad-
hered to ever since. It is that of the
Honorable Judge Reeve, a superior
judge in the Connecticut court and
later a state chief justice. In his
carefully prepared work on Domestic
Relations on Page 254 he says:
"It is a universal rule that all ex-
ecutory contracts which are voidable
on the grounds of infancy may be
avoided during as well as thereaf-
ter."
To this general rule the judge
makes these exceptions, viz:
1. "Contracts for necessaries."
2. "Contracts to effect what the
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infant is compellable to do in chan-
cery as the execution of a trust, etc."
3. "Contracts under which the
infant has so enjoyed or availed him-
self of the consideration that the
parties cannot be restored to their
original position."
This third class fits the case at bar
exactly. The appellee has so availed
himself of the property as to be un-
able to return or restore it as is seen
in the foregoing review of the case.
This view is well supported by a long
line of decisions among which we
find Johnson vs. Northwestern Mut-
ual Life Insurance Company in 26
L.R.A. page 187. Here an infant re-
scinded a contract of life insurance
and sued to recover the consider-
ation by him paid. The court held
that where the personal contract of
an infant is fair and reasonable and
free from any fraud or over-reach-
ing on the part of the other person,
and has been wholly or partly execu-
ted on both sides, so that the infant
has enjoyed the benefit thereof, but
has parted with what he received, or
whenthebenefits are of such a nature
that they cannot be restored, then he
cannot recover back what he has
paid. This theory is certainly appli-
cable to the case in hand. It is ac-
cepted and supported by no less an
authority than Parsons in his Law
of Contracts where on Page 347 he
says:
"If an infant advances money on a
voidable contract which he after-
wards rescinds he cannot recover
this money because it is lost to him
thru his own act and the privilege of
infancy does not extend so far as to
return this money unless it was ob-
tained by fraud."
We see this line of reasoning evi-
denced in the case of Taft vs. Pike,
39 Am. Dec. 228. Here an infant
seeks to rescind an agreement and
recover money paid thereon without
returning the consideration he had
received. It was held that where an
infant has executed a contract on his
part by delivery of property or pay-
ment of money he may not disaffirm
the same without restoring to the
other party what he has received
from him.
"To protect infants from fraud
and improvision," said the court in
the decision of Hall vs. Butterfield,
47 Am. Rep. 209, "which from their
want of understanding and imma-
turity of judgment they are exposed,
they are permitted to allege their
want of capacity to make a contract.
But this privilege is to be used as a
shield rather than a sword; not to do
injustice but to prevent it."
Let it be said here that the coun-
sel is fully aware of the various dis-
abilities of infants to make binding
contracts but we can see, as suggest-
ed in the foregoing opinion, the dis-
astrous results that would be forth-
coming if a liberal construction of
the rule prevailed, thus permitting
the promiscuous and wholesale dis-
affirmance of minority contracts, re-
covery had by the infant without re-
paying his .consideration. This is
precisely what an English judge had
in mind when he said in the case of
Valentini vs. Canadi, L.R. 24 Q.B.
Div. 166.
"Where an infant has paid for
something and has consumed or used
it, it is contrary to natural justice
that he should recover back the money
he has paid."
However it is scarcely necessary
that we refer to foreign opinion
when we find the same view upheld
in so many of own decisions. For in-
stance in the decision of this question
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in.the case of Riley vs. Mallory in 33
Conn. 206, we read as follows:
"The privilege of an infant to
avoid contracts which are injurious
to him and rescind those which are
not, is not an exception to a general
rule but rather a general rule with
exceptions."
The court proceeds at some length
to point out these exceptions naming
as the third:
"Executed contracts where the in-
fant has enjoyed the benefit and can-
not restore the other party to his
original position."
In this action as heretofore sug-
gested the appellant has proved that
the appellee did enjoy the benefits of
his executed contract and he himself
admits a failure to restore the prop-
erty, therefore let us say in conclus-
ion that because of the rules pointed
out and the various authorities cited
thereon we feel that this honored
court should and will reverse the de-
cision in the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
T. SPENCER MCCABE.
BRIEF OF ARTHUR C. KEENEY IN CASE OF
CARPER vs.
State of Indiana
In the Notre Dame Supreme Court,
Marshall Carper, appellant,
VS.
James Whitcomb, by his next friend,
appellee.
Brief for appellee.
1. NATURE OF ACTION
This was an action brought by
James Whitcomb, an infant, thru his
next friend, Thomas Rees, to recover
two hundred dollars paid by the in-
fant on a contract entered into with
Marshall Carper, an adult, for a
horse, buggy, and harness. These
articles of personalty were bought
for pleasure purposes by the infant
and used for that purpose. The in-
fant was a day laborer and worked
for the support of himself and fam-
ily. The infant at the time of bring-
ing the action had sold the buggy
and harness to effect a cure on the
horse which was defective. The horse
was. subsequently condemned by the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals, and shot. At the time of
the bringing of the action the infant
was in possession of no part or any
WHITCOMB.
of the consideration received by him
under the contract. Wherefore the
infant asked a recision of the con-
tract and the return of the consider-
ation paid by him to Marshall Car-
per.
2. ISSUES PRESENTED
(The parties from here on are
designated as to their relation in the
court below).
The plaintiff filed a complaint in
two paragraphs. In the first para-
graph the plaintiff alleged infancy
and incapacity on the part of the
plaintiff, that the articles purchased
were used and were bought for pleas-
ure purposes only, and that the plain-
tiff sold the buggy and harness and
used the proceeds to effect a cure on
the horse, which horse was defective
and was condemned and that the
plaintiff 'at the time of bringing the
action was in possession of no part
nor 'any of the articles of personalty
aforementioned or their proceeds.
In the second paragraph the'plaift.
tiff alleged. fraud.
The defendant demurred seperato
•ly-and severally to the complaint, a±
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the demurrer as to the first para-
graph was overruled and as to the
second it was sustained. The peti-
tion was amended to contain but the
first paragraph, on which latter peti-
tion, the cause was tried.
The defendant filed an answer in
four paragraphs, viz: 1. A General
Denial; 2. Confession and Avoid-
ance, alleging that the plaintiff was
a married man and not entitled to
the disabilities of an infant in con-
tracting; 3. Confession and Avoid-
ance, claiming that a return of the
consideration was a prerequisite to
the avoidance of a contract entered
into by an infant; 4. Estoppel, claim-
ing that the defendant did not know
that the plaintiff was an infant and
that the plaintiff made false repre-
sentations.
The plaintiff demurred separately
and severally to paragraphs two,
three and four of the defendant's
answer. The demurrer as to the sec-
ond and third paragraphs was sus-
tained and as to the fourth para-
graph it was overruled.
The defendant then filed an amend-
ed second paragraph of answer, Con-
fession and Avoidance, claiming that
the articles in question were proper
items of family expense. And, an
additional, a fifth, paragraph, Set
Off, alleging that the depreciation of
the articles in question by reason of
plaintiff's use and misuse of them
and the value of the benefit he re-
ceived from them, should be deducted
from the sum asked by the plaintiff.
T.he plaintiff demurred separately
and severally to the additional fifth
paragraph and the amended second
paragraph. 'The demurrer was sus-
tained as to the fifth paragraph and
overruled as to the second amended
paragraph.
The defendant went to trial then,
on the first paragraph, the amended
second paragraph and the fourth
paragraph of their answer.
The plaintiff filed a reply in gen-
eral denial to the defendant's ans-
wer and the issues were closed.
Trial was had by a jury and a ver-
dict of two hundred dollars for the
plaintiff was returned by them.
Before judgment was entered the
defendant made a motion for a ven-
ire de novo, which the court over-
ruled. The defendant then filed a
motion for a new trial, which motion
the court overruled, whereupon the
defendant prays for an appeal which
is granted.
3. EVIDENCE
The statement of the evidence in
the Appellanf's brief is excepted to
in parts that follow, because of un-
warranted presumptions of truth
and because of variance. A refer-
ence to the trial record, Pages ten to
thirty, will disclose and substantiate
this information. We feel it is our
duty to point out these discrepancies
to the learned court to avoid inevit-
able deception by the artful phrasing
and that justice may be best served.
The plaintiff took the stand and
his testimony was as follows: That
he lived in the basement of an apart-
-cnt in South Bend, Indiana; that
he did chores about the apartment,
and paid ten dollars per month for
rent: that he was married on October
1, 1919, and had one child; that he
worked as a day laborer, receiving
eighteen dollars per week for his
services and that this was his only
source of income. That he entered
into a contract with the defendant;
that he relied on the defendant's hon-
esty and that he was urged by the de-
fendant to buy defendant's horse,
buggy, and harness, for which art-
icles the plaintiff paid defendant his
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life's savings, two hundred dollars;
that he bought the articles for pleas-
ure purposes; that no inquiry was
made as to his status nor did he pro-
fer any information in that regard;
that the horse proved defective on
an attempt to use it; that he had the
horse in his possession two weeks;
that he sold the harness and buggy to
obtain funds to effect a cure on the
horse and did actually expend the
funds for veterinary services on the
horse; that the horse was condemn-
ed on the recommendation of a
Cruelty Prevention officer and the
veterinary who had tieated it; that
he was in possession of no part nor
any of the articles he had received
nor the proceeds of the sale of any of
them.
Mr. Schwertley a witness to the
transaction fully corroborated the
testimony of the plaintiff.
Mr. Dundon testified that he
bought the buggy and harness from
the plaintiff because of a sympathetic
motive, to allow the plaintiff to make
an attempt to save his horse.
Mr. Healey, a veterinary, testified
that he was called upon to effect a
cure upon the horse in question and
found it impossible after working a
week on it. That the horse was so
affected before the purchase of it by
the plaintiff and that he recommend-
ed its destruction.
Mr. Dressel, an officer of the S. P.
C. A. testified that he inspected the
animal aforementioned and recom-
mended that it be condemned. The
board passed on the condemnation
and on their order it was shot. That
he had orders to condemn the horse
while in the possession of the defend-
ant, but did not because the defend-
ant said he could effect a cure on the
horse.
Mr. Murphy, the plaintiff's em-
ployer, testified that the plaintiff
was his employee and that the plain-
tiff received eighteen dollars per
week for his services, and that
grown, adult, men received twenty-
five and thirty dollars per week.
Mr. Miller, recorder of vital statis-
tics, testified, that plaintiff was born
October 1, 1901, from the county
records introduced in evidence.
The defendant took the stand and
testified as follows: That he was a
farmer, living on a farm and dealt
in horses; that he entered into the
contract with the plaintiff because
he thought that the plaintiff was
actually not a minor but an adult.
That he had made public exhibition
of the horse from time to time. That
he did enter into the contract with
the plaintiff as aforementioned.
Mr. Hughes, a student, testified
that he knew the plaintiff for ten
years. That the plaintiff abused the
said horse, and that the plainitff still
had the horse in his possession.
Dr. Foley, a judge of horses, testi-
fied that he judged horses at exhi-
bitions and that he had judged this
horse and found him to be sound.
That he saw said horse but once,
some two years previous to this trial
and identified the horse by a picture
of it, defendant's exhibit No. 1 and
answered the question saying: "It
looks very much like the horse I saw
at the exhibition."
Mr. Brady, testified that he saw
said horse standing outside on the
street, uncovered on a cold day, and
that the horse was suffering.
Mr. Hilkert, a barber testified that
the plaintiff had whiskers.
Mr. Shaw, administrator for the
estate of R. B. Whitcoml , testified
that he paid to James Whitcomb
fifty thousand dollars. That he was
appointed by the Superior Court of
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St. Joseph County, state of Indiana.
He identified a receipt, defendant's
Exhibit No. 2, alleged to have been
signed by the plaintiff.
In Rebutal the plaintiff testified
that he had three uncles who were
living and none dead, and these
uncles were poverty stricken. That
he had not received money from any
source except his wages.
The signature on the receipt (de-
fendant's Exhibit No. 2) was proven
by expert testimony not to be that of
the plaintiff.
4. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. That the articles were not
necessaries.
Goodman vs. Alexander, 55 L. R.
A. 781.
Guthrie vs. Murphy, 28 Amer.
Dec. 681.
Price vs. Sanders, 60 Ind. 30.
2. Marriage is not such emanci-
pation that changes the status of an
infant as to his contract liability.
Beichler vs. Guenther, 96 N. W.
895.
Ryan Vs. Smith, 43 N. E. 109.
House vs. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109.
3. As between different classes of
contracts; and the legal effect on an
infant; disadvantageous contracts
were void; beneficial, i. e., a gift,
were binding; necessaries, binding;
not clearly beneficial or harmful were
voidable at the infant's option.
Wheaton vs. East, 26 Amer. Dec.
251.
Forda vs. Van Horn, 30 Amer.
Dec. 77.
N. & C. R. R. vs. Ell, 78 Amer.
Dec. 506.
4. The right of an infant to dis-
affirm and recover is not dependent
on the return of consideration.
Dill vs. Bowen, 54 Ind. 204.
Carpenter vs. Carpenter, 45 Ind.
142.
White vs. Branch, 51 ind. 210.
Price vs. Furman, 65 Amer. Dec.
194.
Walsh vs. Young, 110 Mass. 396.
That the Court below was correct
in sustaining the demurrer to the de-
fendant's third paragraph of answer.
5. Misrepresentation as to age.
does not estop an infant from suing
and is no defense to his action.
Hayes vs. Parker, 7 Atlan. 581.
Conroe vs. Birdsall, 1 Amer. Dec.
105.
Keen vs. Coleman, 80 Amer. Dec.
524.
Bendett vs. Williams, 30 Fed. 697.
Int'l Text Book Co. vs. Connelly,
42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1115. (1912).
Whitcomb vs. Joslyn, 31 Amer.
Rep. 678.
Sims vs. Eberhardt, 102 U. S. 300.
Albrey vs. Calbert, 93 C. C. A.
517. (1909).
All states rule the same as does
England and Ireland.
The trial court properly refused
the defendant's instruction number-
ed Five.
5. ARGUMENT
The counsel for the appellant has
in his excellent brief confined the
argument in support of his conten-
tion to two theories, in addition
showing some general law. These
two theories are two of four cited in
appellant's brief in the appellant's
grounds for reversal. These two
issues are: First, That the lower
court erred in refusing the appel-
lant's instruction numbered Five.
This instruction stated: That if the
plaintiff had misrepresented his age
to the defendant thereby inducing
the defendant to contract with him,
then the judgment must be for the
defendant.
Second: That the lower court
erred in sustaining plaintiff's de-
murrer to defendant's third para-
graph of answer which was accord-
ingly stricken from the answer. This
paragraph stated: That although the
plaintiff was an infant he must re-
turn the consideration received by
him before he could recover on the
contract and avoid it.
The instruction as stated above
should have been refused, first: be-
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cause it is not the law; second, be-
cause it is incomplete; third, because
it does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a good defense and fourth,
because of the lack of evidence on
the proposition.
In this case the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to ascertain
the age of the plaintiff from appear-
ance and association and even though
such a misrepresentation was
grounded in evidence the plaintiff
would not be precluded from recov-
ery. The infant could have said that
he was fifty years of age and that
would not relieve the defendant of
the duty to know his age or from
liability. The plaintiff was smooth-
faced, small in stature and of a very
juvenile character. The plaintiff in
this case sat on the witness stand
and was beside his counsel through-
out the trial and was in such a posi-
tion that the jury not only knew his
appearance, but knew some of his
habits. The jury decided that the
plaintiff was an infant.
The defendant's refused instruc-
tion number Five cited above as a
ground for a new trial is asking the
learned court to remand this case to
conclude an issue of fact that has al-
ready been decided, for when the
jury found for the plaintiff they
necessarily found the reverse of the
defendant's object in submitting in-
struction numbered Five.
As to the law, the concern of this
learned court, the instruction would
be unfair.
The law brought up-to-date on this
point may be framed in the form of
an instruction given in this case,
which was:
Even though you find that the
plaintiff at the time of entering
into this contract fradulently mis-
represented his age to the de-
fendant and by this act caused the
defendant to enter into this con-
tract; nevertheless you must find
for the plaintiff because fradulent
misrepresentation of age by an in-
fant does not act as a bar to the
rescinding of the contract made
possible only through such act.
Treatise 6 A. L. R. 420.
There was no material evidence in
this case to support a fraudulent mis-
representation. (Pages 10 to 30).
But, to obviate the necessity of
further controversy, the following
ruling will show that the law con-
tained in the defendant's instruction
is fundamentally wrong.
If the allegation that an infant
represented that he was of full age
were ever permitted to destroy an
infant's right of avoiding contracts,
not one in a hundred of his contracts
would be placed in his power to
avoid, for nothing would be easier
than .to prevail upon the infant to
make a declaration which might be
shown evidence of deliberate imposi-
tion on his part, though prompted
solely by the person intended to be
benefited by it. This is fully and
amply supported by Conroe vs. Bird-
sall, 1 Amer. Dec. 105.
In the case of the International
Text Book Co. vs. Connelly, a recent
decision reported in 42 L. R. A. (N.
S.) at page 1115, the facts in brief
were these:
An infant contracted with a cor-
respondence school and represented
himself to be of age. He was held
not to be estopped to plead infancy
in an action on the contract because
of having misrepresented that he was
of age, in the subscription paper, the
court said:
It is well settled in this state
that in an action upon a contract
made by an infant, he is not es-
topped from pleading his infancy
by any representation as to his
age made by him to induce an-
IVOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
other person to contract with him.
In the case of Whitcomb vs. Joslyn,
31 Amet. Rep, 678, the theory is car-
ried to a case in point. An infant
represented to be of age and entered
into a contract and bought a wagon,
he paid part of the purchase price
and failed to pay the balance. The
vendor sold the wagon on this de-
fault. It was held that the infant
was not estopped to avoid the con-
tract and sue for the money he had
paid.
The authorities are all one way,
an estoppel in pais is not applicable
to infants and a fraudulent represen-
tation of capacity cannot be an equiv-
alent for actual capacity. This is
supported by Keen vs. Coleman, 80
Amer. Dec. 524.
The courts take care to make clear
their position on this question. At
law it is conclusively presumed that
a person within the age of twenty-
one is unfitted for business, and that
every contract into which he enters
is to his disadvantage, and that he is
incapable of fraudulent acts which
will estop him from interposing the
shield of infancy against its enforce-
ment. Hayes vs. Parker, 7 Atlan.
581, is quite in point in this connec-
tion.
The cases cited by the appellant in
his brief on this point are to be con-
sidered by the appellee with some
misgiving. Three cases are cited in
support of defendant's instruction
numbered Five.
Commander vs. Brasile, 9 L. R. A.
N. S. 1117
Int'l. Land Co. vs Marshall, 19 L.
R. A. X. S; 1056.
County Board of Education vs.
Hensley, 42 L. R. A. N. S. 643.
The law of the first cast is condi-
tioned on the premise that the infant
receive and use the benefits and that
he was benefitted by the contract. In
this case he was put to a detriment.
Too the case holds:
"We do not hold that any con-
tract may be enforced against an
infant at any time on account of a
false assertion that he is of age,
unless age and appearance indi-
cate such years of maturity as may
well deceive the person with whom
he deals."
The second case is cited for the
purpose of summary and will be
treated after the third case.
In the third case, the age was in-
serted in the contract a much strong-
er case than the one under consider-
ation, but there was no proof of it
having been inserted or allowed
there with the intent to defraud and
does not relieve the disability or
change the character of the action.
The court said:
"It is well settled that in an ac-
tion upon a contract made by an
infant, he is not estopped from
pleading his infancy by any repre-
sentation as to his age made by
him to Induce another person to
contract with him."
The second case sets out that the
infant must fraudulently, willfully.
and intentionally misrepresent his
age so as to give it a tortious charac-
ter. There is no tort in this case, nor
is there any evidence to that effect,
and the action is Ex Contractu. But,
there is evidence to show the good
faith of the plaintiff. (Page 12)
From the decisions and authorities
cited, there can only be one conclu-
sios as to the law and that the De-
fendant's instruction numbered Five
was properly refused.
The second theory of the appellant
Is that the lower court should not
have sustained the Plaintiff's demur-
rer to defendant's third paragraph of
answer.
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The whole list of cases cited on the
return of consideration by the appel-
land in support of his contention pre-
sume a valid consideration received
and a wilful intent to defraud which
are not basic in this case because
they do not exist.
This paragraph of the defendant's
answer does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a good defense.
There was no return of the prop-
erty made in this case:
1. Because of the consideration
having been removed from his pos-
session and out of his control.
2. Because his status as an infant
did not require him to make a return
of the consideration under the cir-
cumstances and acts of this case.
The authorities on this point con-
cur that a failure to return consider-
ation does not preclude recovery.
The case of Green vs Green, 85 N.
Y. 553 is very clear on this point.
That court held:
"The right to repudiate is based
on the incapacity of the infant to
contract, and that incapacity applies
as well to the avails as to the proper-
ty itself, and when the avails of the
property are spent or lost or other-
wise disposed of during minority,
the infant should not be held respon-
sible for an inability to restore them.
To hold him for the consideration
would operate as a serious restriction
upon the right of an infant to avoid
his contract, and in many cases would
destroy the right altogether."
The Lemon Case, 15 N. E. 476 is
strictly in accord, the court said:
"An infant may, before or on
arriving at age, disaffirm a pur-
chase of personally, other than
necessaries, made by him during
his minority, and rucover back the
consideration paid, without restor-
ing the property sold and delivered
to him where is has been taken
from him, or it is sufficient that
the property ceases to be in his
possession or subject to his con-
trol."
In the same class is the case of
Wallace vs. Leroy, 110 Amer. St.
Rep. 777, the case holds:
"That in an action against an
infant to recover the purchase
money of property sold to him,
part of the proceeds he still re-
tains, he is entitled to the plea of
infancy as a defense, without hav-
ing returned or oered to return
such property or proceeds. The
successful intervention of such
plea confers upon the person who
made the sale to the infant only
the right to reclaim his property
or such part of it as remains in the
possession of the infant."
It is admitted that the plaintiff
made no return of the consideration
received by him, but, it must be re-
membered, that since the property
was not in his possession at the time
of rescinding, he is under no com-
pulsion to return the property or
place the defendant in 'status quo' be-
fore rescinding the contract. Sus-
tained by Morse vs Ely 154 Mass.
458, Price vs. Furman 65 Amer. Dec.
194.
These laws as to the return of con-
sideration by an infant have been
consistestly and universally adopted.
In the state of Indiana the reports
running from forty-five to one-hun-
dred and nineteen adopt the follow-
ing law in substance in every case:
When an infant disaffirms a con-
tract, he is not bound to restore
the consideration, where such con-
sideration has been wasted or lost
during his minority, or has become
absorbed in other property; but
so much of the specific considera-
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tion as remains in his hands may
be reclaimed by the party.
In the case under consideration the
infant neither spent nor did he waste
the consideration received, but made
a bonafide attempt to keep it in tact,
and thru no fault of his own it passed
out of his hands. Such an infant is
certainly and surely entitled to res-
cind the contract without making
restitution of the consideration re-
ceived.
Not only where the consideration
is lost or wasted can the infant res-
cind without return of consideration,
but, as in the case of White vs.
Branch 51 Ind. 210, where an infant
received a horse under a contract and
so abused and misused the horse and
depreciated its value to worthless-
ness and he recovered the considera-
tion he had paid.
In the case of Carpenter vs. Car-
penter, 45 Ind. 143--That it is not
necessary to give effect to the disaf-
firmance of a deed for contract of an
infant, that the other party should
be placed in 'status quo.'
The consideration received by the
infant in this case was inferior, that
he acted in good faith, that the con-
sideration could not be returned by
him thru no fault of his own, that
under such facts and circumstances
he was not required to make a re-
turn the articles received by him.
The plaintiff's demurrer to the de-
fendant's third paragraph of 'answer
was properly sustained by the lower
court; first, because the paragraph
did not state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a good defense, and second,
because the law contained therein is
unfair and incorrect.
To sum up the law of this case the
appellee offers the following, in ad-
dition to the propositions given
above. That if this contract gave,
any advantage either way it was in
favor of the defendant and the legal
effect either way if not clearly bene-
ficial to the infant in regard to con-
sideration received, is that the in-
fant may avoid the contract at his
option and recover the consideration
he has paid. N. & C. R. R. vs. Ell.
78 Amer. Dec. 506.
That marriage is not such eman-
cipatfon that changes the status of
an infant as to his contract liability
in this case. Beichler vs. Guinher
96 N. W. 895, Ryan vs. Smith, 43 N.
E. 109.
The articles received by the infant
in this case were for pleasure pur-
poses and must necessarily be for
pleasure purposes and must necessar-
ily be for pleasure purposes because
of his station in life, and therefore
were not necessaries and the word is
construed in an infant's contract.
Goodman vs. Alexander, 55 L. R. A.
781.
6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion the appellee believes
that the decision of the lower court
was correct on both its rulings in re-
jecting the appellant's instruction
numbered Five, because of its em-
bodiment of misstated law and be-
cause it was not supported by evi-
dence; and the sustaining of the Ap-
pellee's demurrer to appellant's third
paragraph of answer, because of its
unfairness, erroneousness, and be-
cause of the lack of facts sufficient
to constitute a good defense.
The infant contracted, paid a con-
sideration, received a consideration
that passed out of his possession and
control, and was not a necessary, and
there being no tortious bar to his re-
covery, and because he had a right to
rescind because of his status, he
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rightfully recovered in the court be- the decision of the lower court be, in
low and should be. sustained in this all things, affirmed.
learned court. Respectfully Submitted,
ARTHUR C. KEENEY,






Alfonso A. Scott- and
James Murtaugh,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Clarence Manion and
Thurmond F. Mudd,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD
Come now the attorneys for the
plaintiff and show to the court that
they filed their complaint and prae-
cipe for summor§ on November 14th,
1921. Return of the sheriff. Plain-
tiff's complaint in one paragraph.
Come now Clarence Manion and
Thurmond Mudd for the defendant
and file a demurrer to the complaint
of the plaintiff. Demurrer sustained.
Plaintiff files an amended complaint
in one paragraph and alleges as fol-
lows: That the defendant falsely
and maliciously, and with intent to
injure the plaintiff's good name and
reputation in the community in
which he resides, i. e., South Bend,
Indiana, County of St. Joseph, did
write .and publish of this plaintiff a
certain false and defamatory letter;
addressed to one Rose Kramer. (H.
I. copy of letter.) And that by rea-
son of this letter the plaintiff, an at-
torney of high standing, was damag-
ed to the Jtent of $1,000.00 and suf-
fered a loss of $000. bec0e of the
rental he had paid on a h,%e which
he and his intended bride were to oc-
CIRCUIT COURT
cupy. And that by reason of this
false letter she refused to marry him
until he had proved the allegations
to be false and untrue."
Comes now the defendant by her
counsel and files an answer to the
complaint of the plaintiff in three
paragraphs: (1) General denial; (2)
Communication was addressed to one
who was an interested party, and
(3) That the facts contained in the
letter were true."
Attorneys for the plaintiff now
file a reply in one paragraph to the
answer of the defendant and deny
each and every allegation of the an-
swer of tle 4efendant.
Cause being At issue the jury were
rnpanelled and sworn, cape submit-
ted to trial. Trial hAd and concluded.
Plaintiff now tenders instructions
nurbered from one to six inclusive,
with a request in writing that each
a4 anll of them be given to the jury.
Defenrant ajsi tenders instractions,
nutberd fr'o one to ten inclusiye,
together with a request in writing
that each apd all of them be given to
the jury. The court now indicates
which instrxreton shall be giyen and
which shall be reftead, which in-
strction jare ordered made a part
of tbhis reword withhout a bill of ex-
ceptions.
Ajrp ntg o the copurqseJ are now
heard and the co.rt inftr~cts the
jgy, Itd. as instrctiogns numbered
from one to twelve inclu~iye, ordered
a wrt of this record withot a bill
of ?xceptions.
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
The jury now retire in charge of
a sworn jury bailiff to deliberate
upon the case and arrive at a just
verdict. Come again the jury into
open court with their general ver-
dict, to-wit: "We the jury find for
the defendant as against the plain-
tiff. S. E. Carmody, Foreman."
Comes now the plaintiff by his at-
torneys and moves the court for a
judgment "non obstante veridicto."
Motion overruled and plaintiff ex-
cepts. Plaintiff now files a motion
for a new trial. Motion overruled.
Plaintiff excepts. Plaintiff now files
a motion in arrest of judgment. Mo-
tion overruled. Plaintiff excepts.
Court now renders judgment on
the verdict; to which the plaintiff
excepts.
Plaintiff now prays an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
which is granted and five days are
given in which to file a general bill
of exceptions. Ten days are given
the said plaintiff in which to file ap-
peal bond in the sum of $200.00, with
C. Haggerty and F. Hughes as sure-
ties thereon, which bond so executed




South Bend Motor Sales Co.
John P. Brady, and
E. John Hilkert,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Charles Foley, and
J. Paul Cullen,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD
The plaintiff by his attorneys
'shows to the court the filing of the
,complaint of the plaintiff, in two
paragraphs and the filing of the
praecipe, which was duly issued by
the clerk and served by the sheriff.
The summons returned by sheriff.
Plaintiff files complaint.
Comes now the defendant and files
a motion to strike out certain parts
of the complaint of the plaintiff. Mo-
tion sustained partially to the first
paragraph, and motion sustained to
the entire second paragraph.
Plaintiff now files an amended com-
plaint in one paragraph, and alleges
that the defendant offered to sell him
a 1920 Maxwell car in first class con-
dition, free from all defects. And
that the plaintiff purchased the said
machine. That the machine sold the
plaintiff was a second class machine
and defective in its mechanism. That
the plaintiff, as soon as he ascertain-
ed the actual condition of the ma-
chine, offered to return it and re-
ceive his money back, and a release
and discharge from the agreement.
Wherefore he demands a release
from the agreement and $900.00 pur-
chase price with interest from day of
purchase.
Defendant moves to strike out cer-
tain parts of the complaint. Motion
overruled. Defendant excepts. De-
fendant's attorneys file a deriurrer
to the complaint. Overruled. Ex-
ception.
Defendant now files an answer to
the complaint of the plaintiff in two
paragraphs, 1) General Denial, 2)
Confession and Avoidance.
Plaintiff files a motion to strike
out the second paragraph of the an-
swer. Overruled. Exception. Plain-
tiff files 4 motion to require the de-
fendant to separate the second par-
agraph into separate defenses. Ov-
erruled. Exception. Plaintiff now
files a demurrer to the second para-
graph of the answer. Demurrer sus-
tained.
Attorneys for the defendant now
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file an amended second paragraph of
answer.
Plaintiff files a demurrer to the
second paragraph. Overruled. Ex-
ception. Plaintiff now files a reply in
denial to the answer of the defend-
ant.
Cause being at issue, jury empan-
nelled and sworn, and case submitted
to trial. Trial of the case is conclud-
ed.
Come now the attorneys for the
plaintiff and file a request for the
submission of four interrogatories
to the jury in the event that the jury
return a general verdict. Defendant
objects. Objection sustained to two
of the interrogatories.
Plaintiff now tenders instructions
numbered from one to five inclusive
with a request in writing that each
and all o fthem be given to the jury.
Defendant now files instructions
numbered from one to four inclusive
with a request in writing that each
and all of them be given to-the jury.
The court now indicates which shall
be given and which shall be refused,
which instructions are ordered filed
and made a part of this record with-
out a bill of exceptions.
Arguments of the counsels are now
heard and the court instructs the
jury, and files instructions numbered
from one to eleven inclusive, ordered
a part of this record without a bill
of exceptions.
The jury now retire in charge of a
sworn jury bailiff to deliberate upon
the case and arrive at a just verdict.
Come again the jury into open court
with their general verdict, to-wit:
"We, the jury find for the defendant
as against the plaintiff. F. Hughes,
Foreman."
Their answers to the interrogator-
ies of the plaintiff were: "I) Was the
automobile fit for the purpose for
which it is ordinarily used? Answer.
Yes.
2) Was there any defect which
could not have been discovered by
one not familiar with automobile
mechanics upon ordinary examina-








Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Frederick Dressel, and
James Murphy,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD
Plaintiff files praecipe declaring in
the action of special assumpsit
(Breach of Promise). Process order-
ed for the defendant, returnable
April 1st, 1922. Plaintiff shows is-
sue and service of process. Defend-
ant comes by counsel. Plaintiff files
declaration (H. I.) Defendant files
plea in two counts, general issue and
confession and avoidance. Cause
pending on the issues.
EDWIN J. MCCARTHY,
Clerk.





Aaron Jones, Alexander Smith, John
D. Person, Samuel Adams and Josua
Simpson
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The United States Government
was about to locate a Federal Build-
ing in South Bend. There las keen
rivalry between the advocates to two
locations. Ten prominent citizens
had purchased the location on the
corner of Main and Colfax streets
while the plaintiff owned the corner
property at Michigan and Jefferson.
The owners of the Main and Colfax
location were making strong efforts
to induce the Government through
the Department of Justice officials
to locate the Court building at that
point. The Plaintiff was an influen-
tial politician and his property was
really the more desirable for the lo-
cation of the proposed building. To
induce plaintiff to offer his property
to the Government at a figure less
than he was willing to sell it for, and
to secure the location of the building
there so as to enhance materially the
respective properties of the defend-
ants which were in the vicinity of the
plaintiff's property, and to secure
the active efforts of plaintiff towards
obtaining the recommendation of the
officials of the department of justice
for the location of the proposed
building, the several defendants
promised to execute their promissory
note to plaintiff in the sum of $2500
payable one year after the location
of the building as proposed.
Plaintiff accepted the proposition
of the defendants, offered his proper-
ty to the Government for $2500 less
than it was really worth, and exerted
his influence with the interested of-
ficials and succeeded in securing the
location and erection of the building.
Plaintiff exerted no improper influ-
ence, was guilty of no fraud, and, in
fact, merely represented the merits
of his location as compared with
those of the other location. Plain-
tiff did nothing to secure the location
of the building for himself and his
defendants, than the other ten prom-
inent citizens did to secure the loca-
tion of the building at the other point.
The properties of the defefidants
were materially enhanced in value as
a result of the location of the Gov-
ernment Building, each defendant
profiting to the extent of at least
$1,000 additional or increased valua-
tion to his respective property.
The note is due and unpaid and
plaintiff brings this action to recover
thereon.
Eugene J. Payton, and
Charles Robitaille,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover
on the note of defendant because the
note is valid in that it has all the es-
sentials of a valid promissory note,
has become due and is unpaid.
The only question presented in
this case is the legality of considera-
tion for the note.
In Clark on Contracts, page 358,
the author points out that influence
brought to bear on public officials,
acting in a capacity similar to pub-
lic officials involved in this case, is
not illegal in itself, but becomes so
only where corrupt means are to be
resorted to. This same principle of
the law is upheld in the following
cases:
Sedgwick vs. Stanton, 14 N. Y.
467.
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Painter vs. Drum, 40 Pa. 467.
State vs. Johnson, 52 Ind. 197.
Elkhart Co. vs. Crary, 98 ind.
238.
As in the case of contracts to ren-
der services in procuring the passage
of acts and ordinances, so also in
case of contracts to render services
in procuring administrative action
by governing officials, the services
contracted for may be legitimate. If
the contract does not tend to induce
use of corrupt means, and if corrupt
means are not to be resorted to the
contract is valid.
Lyon vs. Mitchell, 93 Am.
Dec. 502.
Winpenny vs. French, 18 Ohio
469.
Barry vs. Capin, 23 N. E. 735
(Mass.)
Beal vs. Polkemis, 34 W. 532
(Mich.)
Angel F. Mercado, and
Rev. S. Woywod,
Attorneys for Defendant.
1. No person can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious
to the public or against the public
good. And where a contract tends to
be injurious to the public or against
the public good, it will be declared
void, although in the particular in-
stance no injury to the public may
have resulted. Contracts, 13 C. J.
Sec. 360; Carbondale vs. Brush, 82
N. E. 252; Palmbaum vs. Magulsky,
104 N. E. 746: Peterson vs. Chris-
tensen, 4 N. W. 623; Teal vs. Walk-
er, 111 U. S. 242; Cothran vs. Ellis
346.
2. When the general public is in-
terested in the location of a public
office, a contract to influence its lo-
cation at a particular place for indi-
vidual benefit or personal gain 1s
against public poliey.
Contracts, 13 C. J. Sec. 375;
Spence vs. iarvey, 80 Am. Dec.
89;
Elkhart County Lodge vs. Crary,
98 Ind. 238-49 A. R. 746;
Woodman vs. Innes, 27 A. S. R.
274;
Benson vs. Bowden, 113 N. W.
20.
3. It matters not that nothing im-
proper was done or was expected to
be done by the plaintiff. It is not
necessary that actual fraud should
be shown. Nor is it necessary that
any evil was in fact done by or
through the contract in order to make
the contract void.
State vs. JQhnson, 52 Ind. 197;
The Providence Tool Co. vs.
Morris, 2 Wal. 45; 17 L. Ed. 868;
Elkhart County Lodge vs. Cra-
ry, 98 Ind. 238, 49 A. R. 746.
4. A negotiable instrument given
upon an illegal transaction is like
any other simple contract as between
the immediate parties and cannot be
enforced. As between the original
parties the illegality of the note is a
good defense.
Union Collection Co., vs. Buck-
man, 119 A. S. R. 164-
Glass vs. Murphy, 4 Ind. App.
530, 31 N. E. 545;
Chesbrough vs. Wright, 41






On March 1, 1921, Coleman wrote
to Swartz, offering to sell his house
for $10,000, offering to give a deed
in exchange for the purchase price
on June 1, 1921.
Coleman conoluded his offer in
these words; "If I do not hear from
you to the contrary by April 15th, I
shall consider that you have accept-
ed.
Swartz rewMd tha offer in due
course a.wl never replied. On March
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15 Swartz decided to buy the house,
and on April 10 fchanged his mind,
but on June 1st, 1921 he tendered to
Coleman the $10,000 aid demanded
the deed. Coleman refused.
Swartz brings action for $500
damages for breach.
George J. Dawson, and
Joseph M. Casey,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Here was a complete Contract.
There was a continuing offer and an
offer of this kind is deemed to con-
tinue in force until accepted, rejected
or withdrawn. It may be withdrawn
at any time before accepted uncon-
ditionally The general rule of law
now is that a contract may be specifi-
cally enforced even though it origin-
ated in an offer which remained open
some time before acceptance.
Here, as in other like cases, if
both parties meet one prepared to
accept and the other to retract,
whichever speaks first will have the
law with him. An offer is a continu-
ing offer until it is withdrawn and
notice thereof given andWtzfifiOm
the withdrawal communicated and
if it is accepted before withdrawn
and notice thereof given and within
the time expressl yor impliedly lim-
ited, the agreement is complete and
the offer is no longer revocable. An
offer to buy or sell land does not re-
quire as prompt an acceptance as an
offer to buy or Sell chattels, etc.
Cheney vs. Cook, 7 Wis. 41-3:
Alford vs. Wilson. 2.0 Fed. 96.
Keller vs. Ybarru R Cal. 14 ':
Cooper vs. Lansing. 54 N. W;
Boston & Main Railroad Case
Cush. 224.
Yerkes vs. Richards, 153 Pa.,
646, 9 Cyc. 285;
Quick vs. Wheeler, 78 N. Y. 300.
J. Melvin Rohrbach, and
Jooeph E. O'Brien.
Attorneys for Defendant.
ACCEPTANCE - It is immaterial
that by the terms of the offer a cer-
tain time within which to signify his
acceptance is given the party to
whom the offer is made. Such offer
must be supported by consideration
before binding.
Coleman vs. Applegate 11 Atl.,
284.
Eskridge vs. Glover, N. Am.
Dec. 344.
Cooper vs. Wheel Co. 54 N. W.
39.
CONTINUING OFFER-Is terminat-
ed automatically by the lapse of a
reasonable time. Facts put forth a
reasonable time.
Okley vs. Cook, 21 L. R. A. 127.
Stone vs. Harmon, 19 N. W. 188
Ferrier vs. Storn, 19 N. W. 288.
.. OPTION-1. No option-lack of
consideration. 2. Facts do not put
forth an option. Merely a tentative
date, (June 1, 1921) in which the
final terms of the sale were to be con-
summated.
6 R. C. L. 663.
ACCEPTANCE-Data on No. 2 clause
was merely to have further negotia-
tions. Letter mere proposal to do
business.
Cooper vs. Wheel Co. (Mich.)
54 N. W. 39.
Chicago vs. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240.
GENUINENESS OF CONSENT-No
genuineness of consent by party,
Swartz, when he failed to answer the
letter because an acceptance which
does not go beyond an uncommuni-
cated mental determination, reason
of any form in which the offer is does
not create a binding contract either
by framed, or becauae of the inten-
tion t Qaecept did exist.
Felthouse vs. Bindley, 11 C. B.
(NS) 869.
Corlis vs. White; 46 N. Y. 142.
MUTUALITY-23 R. C. L. 1284-
Aeeptanoe mu- . be evidenced in
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some positive manner. A mental de-
termination not indicated by speech,
or put in course of indication by act
to the other party, is not acceptance
which will bind the other. Mactier vs.




Springbrook Park Assn. Inc.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Springbrook Park Association is a
corporation duly incorporated, or-
ganized and operating under the laws
of the State of Indiana. The Asso-
ciation owns or leases what is known
as Springbrook Park, adjoining the
City limits of South Bend, Indiana,
where it conducts under its auspices,
county fairs, races and other general
public amusements, charging admis-
sion, etc.
At the conduct of the recent Inter-
state Fair in the Park, among a num-
ber of policemen employed by the as-
sociation to police the grounds, etc.,
was James Fitzmorris. The plain-
tiff on Thursday evening, Sept. 1921,
along with other lads (young men
ranging in age from fifteen years to
twenty years) went to the Park to
attend the fair. Some of the boys
paid their way in, while the plaintiff
and Johnny Jones, hopped the fence,
the other fellows sought to attract
Fitzmorris attention from the plain-
tiff. The policeman did not see the
plaintiff steal his way in the park,
but plaintiff, when he saw the police-
man, started to run and the police-
man, suspecting that plaintiff had
beat his way in started after him.
When Fitzmorris came near the
plaintiff, plaintiff stopped and turned
half way around, the policeman strik-
ing him across the sid, of the face,
cutting a gash in the cheek and side
of the head. Several stitches were
required to properly care for the
wound, the plaintiff was in the hos-
pital for a week and will have a scar
as a result of the wound inflicted.
Fitzmorris intended to eject plaintiff
from the park.
Action against the Springbrook
Park Association for damages in the
sum of two thousand dollars.
Patrick J. O'Connell, and
George J. O'Grady,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
It is admitted that the relation of
master and servant existed between
the defendant and Fitzmorris at the
time of the assault and battery. To
this relation which exists between
the Springbrook Park and Fitzmor-
ris applies the Doctrine of respon-
deat superior. A master is liable be-
cause it is on the whole better that
he should suffer than that innocent
third persons should bear the loss of
such an act. In support of this point
we submit the following cases:
Duckson vs. Waldron, 135 Ind.
507;
Schulz vs. Paul, Vol 1, N. D.
Sup. Ct. Rep.
Singer vs. Phipps, 49 Ind. App.
116.
The plaintiff alleges that unreason-
able and excessive force may not be
used in the ejection of a tresspasser
from the land tresspassed upon.
Talmadge vs. Smith, 59 N; W.
656.
Newcome vs. Russell, 22 L. R. A.
724.
James R. Emshwiller, and
John M. Gleason,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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ONLY OUR OWN OPINION
EDITORIALS
CLASS OF '22 AT THE BAR
The School of Law is justly proud
of the records made by its graduates
at the bar examinations throughout
the States. Beginning with the
adoption of the present system of
final written examination as a condi-
tion precedent to graduation the men
of the Law School, as a class each
year, have done remarkably well at
the ensuing first bar examination in
their respective States for admission
to practice their chosen profession.
With the expansion and improvement
of the pleading, practice and court
courses this record of success at the
bar examinations has become even
more pronounced. If, as must be ex-
pected, a very few do not succeed in
their first attempt for admission,
perhaps due to exceptionally difficult
tests, invariably these are successful
in the second effort.
Not only do the men of the Law
School pass their examinations suc-
cessfully but they generally pass
with distinction, so much so that the
applicants from Notre Dame have
come to be received at these examin-
ations and hailed by the other appli-
cants as are Rockne's warriors from
N. D. on the gridiron.
The glowing reports of the men of
'20 and '21 are still vividly in mind.
And with their remarkable successes,
uniformly high ratings, conspicuous
attainments and reflected credit on
old N. D. U. still ringing sweetly in
our ears, we must comment on the
recent chronicle from Ohio, the extra-
ordinary beginning in mid-year, of
the class of '22.
Bernard Vincent Pater and John
Joseph Buckley were eligible to take
the Ohio Bar Examination in Decem-
ber. With more than half their
senior year to go we frankly express-
ed our misgiving about the result.
But these men of '22 girded them-
selves for the fray, went two abreast
to Columbus, Ohio, successfully com-
batted the legal elements, and sent
back enthusiastic telegrams which
may be paraphrased thus: "We have
met the enemy, and they are ours"-
two certificates of admission to the
Bar, two full-fledged lawyers from
Ohio, and two scoops for the Class
of '22.
The large delegations that go to
the June examinations in Ohio and
Iowa, and to the July examination in
Illinois, as well as the other men of
'22 who take their bar examinations
in other states, are encouraged and
spurred on by the exceptional succes
attained by these two men of Ohio.
The thankfulness and congratula-
tions of the School of Law to you,
Bernard Vincent Pater and John Jo-
seph Buckley.
E. I. C.
Since the foregoing was set in type
Mr. Robert P. Galloway of the Class
of '22 has been officially notified of
his successful passing of the New
York Bar in March.
4>-
THE SANCTION OF THE LAW
Sanction of Law is the power to
compel the enforcement of the law.
Without the element of force, law
cannot be rendered effective. The
assurance that punishment will fol
low swift and certain after the vio-
lation of a legislative enactment is
the greatest weapon that society has
to rely on. It is better to make this
penalty slight and be certain that it
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will be applied than to make it- heavy
and have it applied only occasionally.
Today, the United States is suffer-
ing from crime largely because jur-
ies will not convict. It is not be-
cause the penalties attached to the
violation of laws are too heavy, but
it is due to a false sentimentalism.
The laxity of juries in this respect is
largely responsible for the increase
in crime. If there was a moral cer-
tainty that juries would convict
When they were presented with the
proper evidence, much of the present
crime would cease and the possibili-
ty of future crimes would be greatly
deminished. If it is necessary to
weaken the sanction of the law in or-
der to convict criminals, weaken it
by all means. Perhaps the con-
sciences of juries may become better
in this respect or perhaps they may
:become hardened so that at some fu-
ture time, a more severe penalty may
be placed upon violations of law.
Society was instituted because man
is a social animal and demands in-
tercourse with his fellows. However,
if degeietates and morons are per-
mitted to prey on society, man will
lose much of his social side and will
revert to the law of the club. If so-
ciety is to maintain its primary
function namely, the promotion of
social and commercial relations
among its members, crime must be
diminished and criminals must be
apprehended and punished. This
can only be accomplished by enforc-
ing the laws that are on the statute
books. When juries are confronted
with sufficient facts to convict a man
they must not hesitate to administer
the full sanction of the law. If they
continue to hesitate in the future as
they have done in the immediate
past, crime will continue to spread
with alarming rapidity until the
whole fabric of government comes
tumbling over the shoulders of every
citizen. The present is the time to
cure past offenses and to prevent fu-
ture violations. Lax enforcement
has failed. Try strict enforcement




At the mention of Legal Ethics
many so-called wise men are inclined
to turn their heads and smile in a
knowing way. However, Legal
Ethics exist and the code of legal
ethics is one of the finest profession-
al guides possessed by any group of
men practicing a common art. The
Bar Associations of each state are
beginning to place more and more
stress on this branch of learning and
the code itself is being more strictly
adhered to in practice. A few years
ago, it was a unique thing to hear of
a lawyer being debarred for malprac-
tice. Today, the event is not remark-
able by any means. Legal shysers
and tricksters are being forced from
the profession and their places are
being filled by clean-minded men who
are a credit to the noble profession
which they serve. Morality is com-
ing to the front in the Law more
than it is in any other profession.
There may be unwritten codes of
ethics in other professions, but in the
Law, the code is written, definitely
and clearly. An offense against the
Ethical code is easily detected and the
result is generally disastrous to the
one who has wandered from the path
of professional duty. This adher-
ence to the legal code of ethics will do
a great deal to elevate the practice
of the law to its exalted position. It
is the most important profession in
the world and the men who practice
it should be the cleanest and most
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honorable body in the world. The
ordinary client is wholly dependent
upon the attorney who ;represents,
him and the Legal profession is do-
ing everything in its power to make
certain that he will be represented
only by a man who is competent to
act professionally, eager to see jus-
tice done, and morally able to resist
the temptations that might be thrown
in his path because of the helpless-
ness of his client.
J. J. B.
THREE NEEDED STEPS OF PROGRESS
In a recent address at a banquet
of the Chicago Bar Association Wil-
liam Howard Taft, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, took for his sub-
ject "Three Needed Steps of Pro-
gress." He opened his address with
saying that the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts has been vastly en-
larged, that dormant powers of the
Federal Government under the Con-
stitution have been made active, and
the Federal Government has poked
its nose into a great many fields
where it was not known before, for
lack of Congressional initiation.
Chief Justice Taft then started to
show how the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts has been enormously en-
larged and the .following is the sub-
stance of his remarkable address:
In the first place, the giving to the
Federal trial courts jurisdiction of
suits involving federal questions,
without regard to citizenship was one
addition. Then the enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Law and the
casting upon Federal Courts the re-
visory power over the action of the
Interstate Commerce Commission
was another. Then, the Anti Trust
Law, the Railroad Safety Appliance
Law, the Adamson Law, the Federal
Trade Commission Law, the Clayton
Act, the Federal Employers' Liabili-
ty Law, the Pure Food Law, the
White Slave Law, and other acts, and
finally the Eighteenth Amendment
and the Volstead Act, have expanded
the civil and criminal jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts of first instance,
to such an extent that unless some-
thing is done, they are likely to be
swamped -and delay is a denial of
Justice. An increase of the judges
in the Federal System is absolutely
necessary. The existing arrange-
ment of courts and districts in nine
circuits is a matter of long standing.
The arrangement has really been
outgrown and ought to be changed.
The second step that should be
taken is a simplification of the pro-
cedure in all cases in the Federal
trial courts. There still exists that
distinction between actions at law,
and suits in equity and suits in admir-
alty. There is no 'reason why this
distinction, so far as actual practice
is concerned, should not be abolished
entirely, and what are now actions in
law, in equity, and in admiralty,
should not be conducted in the form
of one civil action, just as is done in
the Code States. Of course the right
of jury trial secured by the Consti-
tution is civil cases involving over
$20. must be preserved and can be
without much difficulty, and can be
reconciled with the right of a man
under equity procedure to certain
forms of more satisfactory remedy,
preventive and otherwise. What
can be done in Great Britain in this
regard can certainly be done here,
and the simplicity of the practice
there reflects on the enterprise of
the lawyers on this side of the water.
The third step to be taken is a
change in the jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court. In the first place the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is defined in a great many different
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statutes and special acts, and it has
really become a trap for the unwary.
Some are now working on a proposed
bill to simplify the statement of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
and have it embraced in one statute.
The three reforms, therefore, are,
first, an increase in the Judicial force
in the trial Federal Courts, and an
effective distribution of the force by
a council of judges; second, simplici-
ty of procedure in the trial Federal
Courts; and third, a reduction in the
obligatory jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court and an increase in the
field of its discretionary jurisdiction
by certiorari. It thus will remain
the supreme revisory tribunal, but
will be given sufficient control of the
cases which come before it, to enable
it to remain the one Supreme Court
and to keep up with its work.
B. V. P.
COLLEGE EDUCATION FOR LAWYERS.
A certain learned Jurist has arous-
ed considerable comment over his
proposal that no man should be ad-
mitted to the Bar unless he can show
a degree in the liberal arts or its
equivalent. There is a great deal to
be said on both sides of the proposi-
tion. An education in the liberal arts
broadens the mind of the student and
renders him more able to grasp the
profound maxims of the law. It
gives him a more extensive knowl-
edge of history and science. It en-
ables him to better appreciate the
nice distinctions of pleading. It pre-
pares him to know more about hu-
manity and by this increased knowl-
edge to better analyze the motives
prompting certain acts that he will
be called upon to judge. Surely these
things are good and desirable. How-
ever, there is another aspect to the
problem. If compulsory college
training became a necessary part of
the requirements for admission to
the Bar, many men would be forced
to throw aside their ambitions and
aspirations and be content with an-
other profession. In all probability,
a great amount of valuable talent
would be lost to the legal profession.
The practice of the Law would be-
come a pastime for the rich. The
poor would be forced to be content
with other branches of learning
which would be less exact in their
requirements. Throwing the reins
of the law into the hands of wealth
would be one way of making the line
between rich and poor more distinct
and pronounced. Another objection
to the proposition is that during his
college career, a student is apt to be-
come hardened to study and when he
takes up the threads of the law, he
would not be inclined to weave them
into a strong cable. The scattered
strands would fade in his grasp and
the result would be that he would not
finish his legal preparation with the
knowledge that is possessed by a
man who comes fresh and eager to
this mighty stream of knowledge.
Given the ideal student and there is
no doubt but that he will make a bet-
ter lawyer if he is equipped with a
degree in the liberal arts and a de-
gree in Law than he would be if he
were trained only in the Law. How-
ever, we are inclined to think that
with the ordinary man, a thorough
course in law bolstered by some aca-
demic study is more desirable than
two entire college courses. We would
advise that no student be given a de-
gree until he finished his professional
course for once a degree is obtained,
the student is apt to become harden-
ed to his task and the ultimate goal
is lessened because it has been half
won. Surround the objective with
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the glamour that can be had only And when he leaves this place of
when a man approaches it for the mortals
first time. With face turned toward the golden
J. J. B. portals,
0o He'll get there with both feet."
SERVICE: HONEST AND FAITHFUL. Put your shoulder to the wheel and
keep up your spirit. Then, when
Military men have a wonderful life's troubles are over some sage
knack at phrasing curtly and clearly will write your reward with the
and completely. Long explanations phrase: "Service: Honest and faith-
are not considered. They speak and ful."
in a few words tell a story that can- J. J. B.
not be misunderstood. Aat the close __
of the war, most of the discharges UNDERSTANDING MEN
from military service bore the in- Man is the biggest problem of man-
scription: "Service: honest and faith- kind. The solving of this problem is
ful." This phrase told a great and difficult because each case presents a
wonderful story. It spoke of labor different phase of th cae esubject.
and sacrifice. It told of danger and It is impossible to build principles orhardship. It bespoke a spirit ready enact laws that will give each man
to serve and a service that was true eats a t l gie ac smato te siri whch romtedit.To-the greatest amount of justice possi-
to the spirit which prompted it. To- ble. However, laws are enacted notday, the men who won this military so much to protect the individual ashonor are laboring in fields afar. for the benefit of society. But socie-
Some are in the work-shop; some are ty is composed of a sum total of in-
in offices. Others have sought the dividuals and if the individual is dis-
soil as producers while many are en- regarded, the effect of such neglect
gaged in professions. How many of will invariably reflect on society as
those men who won the phrase of dis- wle ab reflec on sots
tinction are carrying on in the spirit are enforcing laws, they should strive
that won it? How many of those who
never had a chance to win it in mili- to make allowances for individual
tary work are striving to achieve it differences. They should not over-
in civil life? It can be won now as it look the human element. Up to the
was then. Perhaps it will not take present, society has been more con-
wathemefo. Perhaps it will otta cerned over the safety of property
the same form. Perhaps it will be than it has over the safety of its
a more substantial form. However, parts. This has led many who are
it can be won by every man and wo- proey owers to disregard
man in the world if they will merely not property owners to disregardlabo towin.Wor isthe ean bylaws and this disregard has led to alabor to win. Work is the means by great portion of the crimes commit-
which it can be won and the spirit to
work honestly and faithfully is the ted. We do not recommend laxity
only spirit that will brihg the much in the enforcement of laws nor do we
desired reward. As George Ade has recommend babying criminaals, but
said: we do recommend that some consid-
eration be given to the things that go
"The man who does the best he can to make up character-namely en-
Whatever be the field of his endeavor, vironment, education, and heredity.
Will find life full and sweet. Each of these is responsible for some
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of the criminals. Therefore, legis-
latures should strive to eliminate the
cause of crime rather than to spend
all of their time framing laws to pro-
tect property by punishing men who





To the University Freshmen of
Notre Dame, at the Oliver Hotel, May
27, 1919. (Those Freshmen are to-
day's Seniors).
By Francis J. Vurpillat.
Gentlemen of the Jury:-
A few (lays ago I was unceremon-
iously held up on a busy thorough-
fare of the city of South Bend, by a
freshman lawyer named Foley. Pre-
sumably acting for the other law-
yers as well as for himself, he ar-
rested me and ordered me to appear
here on this occasion. Upon my pro-
mise to do so, he permitted me to go
on my own recognizance. In fear I
have come; in duress I am here,
compelled to eat and, what. is worse,
to speak-worse for you.
To add insult to injury these fel-
lows brought me here to the table,
leaving me under the impression that
this affair was to be an exclusive
Freshmen Law Banquet as hereto-
fore, so that the torture I have pre-
pared to inflict on them must now be
visited upon this great gathering of
University Freshmen. The extem-
pore effort, prepared in the dark
hours of last night is nothing com-
pared with the effort of my friend,
Cooney, who must have labored day
and night for weeks on his speech.
Yet this thirteen inch gun must be
unloaded. The only difference it will
make will be in the greater casualty
list. To meet this the engineers may
call upon the doctors for aid, and the
merhanical engineers may bury the
dead in the light of the electricians,
while the journalists may write the
obituaries and the epitaphs.
Now, I am prosecuting this gang
of conspirators, including, of course,
the arch-conspirator just named. I
am also including as defendants the
inferior court that assumed to act
without any jurisdiction, and the of-
ficer who had apparent but not legal
authority to make the arrest. This
is not a criminal case as the charac-
ters of the conspirators indicate it
might well be, but it is a civil action
for the tort of false imprisonment of
no less a personage than the "prof."
himself. "Lo! the poor Indian"-the
poor prof. of the Nbtre Dame Law
School.
You will observe, Gentlemen of the
Jury, that I am the plaintiff in the
case and that the plaintiff is his own
lawyer. I am prosecuting my own
case, although I am fully cognizant
of the old legal adage that "a lawyer
who pleads his own case has a fool
for a client." But I'll say to you,
Gentlemen, that I am just foolish
enough to do that very thing in this
case.
I am demanding untold, illimitable
damages of every kind and descrip-
tion known to the written and the
unwritten law-damages called nom-
inal, actual, compensatory, punitive,
exemplary and vindictive; and, if
my good co-prof. here, who teaches
damages, has any other kind in his
category, I shall be glad to include
them also. Gentlemen, I am demand-
ing the modest sum of $1,000,000.
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Why not? I have a livd precedent to
support me, in the case of Henry
Ford vs. the Chicago Tribune. What
manner of man is this our Caesar,
this our Ford, that he may feed on
a $1,000,000, when this plaintiff
may not? Therefore, in like consid-
eration, I should have a verdict for
S1,000,000 actual, compensatory dam-
ages. However, Gentlemen, if you
should find that the proven character
of the plaintiff is such that he can-
not be actually damaged; or, if you
should be of the opinion that the Chi-
cago Tribune has millions for' de-
f ense and tribute while these conspir-
ator defendants have not even cents;
or, in short, you should feel that
rlaintiff's case is only an inwria sine
danino, then, of course, shall I have
to be satisfied with the customary
nominal damage of one dollar. In
truth, Gentlemen, since I have given
this matter of damages a second
thought, 1 really don't care for $1,-
000,000 as much as I do for vindica-
tion. So I ani really willing to sac-
rifice myself on the altar of the court,
as did the late Theodore Roosevelt in
his libel case against the Mankato
paper when he renounced his right to
actual damages and magnanimously
accepted his nominal dollar. I am
consenting to have you put me in the
same class with Mr. Roosevelt, of
course, not as a dead one.
But perhaps you do not think I
have any case at all-that I have only
a damnumn absque in.,,zria, which, as
vou learned, is defined for the sake of
freshmen memory as a damn bad in-
jury without a remedy. Can it be
possible that you may have relegated
the poor plaintiff prof. to such a sta-
tus in his all-important case? I can
hardly think so. But lest I should
fail to resort to every known tech-
nicality and flaw of the law in my
client's behalf, I shall now proceed
to take the law into my own hands
for redressing this grievous wrong,
careful, however, as the law of torts
demands in such case, not to commit
breach of the peace.
First of all, I shall resist this ille-
gal arrest and break this false im-
prisonment. I shall run to the near-
est wall and turn my back to it so
as to supply myself with the tangible
evidence of the right to invoke the
ancient law of self-defense, or, I shall
stand my ground right here where I
have a right to be, and being myself
without fault, I shall invoke the
modern law of self-defense and repel
the assaults of my aggressors, force
with force, to the very extent of over-
throwing the entire freshmen law
class. Then I shall resort to slander-
ing the class careful, however, that
no one else shall hear it, so as not to
furnish the element of publication.
Then I shall say all the mean things
about the class and its members even
to the point of provoking an assault,
careful, however, not to let any one
get near enough to me to furnish the
element of present ability to commit
the assault.
" Now then," there's Jones of Illi-
nois and Jones of New York. I don't
knot, of anything commoner than
"The Two Joneses," unless perhaps,
it might be the "Gold dust Twins."
Yes, there is some thing as common
as Jones, and that's Smith of Minne-
sota. Blacksmith, Locksmith, or
John Smith. famed for having kid-
napped Pocahontas.
There is the Ohio delegation be-
ginning with Delmar Edmondson.
He has copped everything in the oth-
er colleges of the University and has
come to put one over on the Law
School; and,- concededly, he can do it
if he stays. He is 3uspected of hay-
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
ing eleven talents, he always plays
right, is a playwright-in fact he is
a veritable George Ade of the Uni-
versity. And there is the other end
of the Ohio delegation, the Weisend,
and between these ends of the Ohio
minstrels are Flick-er Buckley and
Nyan to them are Moran Prokop,
whatever that is, and there's the fel-
low we call Pater, but who, accord-
ing to the correct pronunciation of
the Justinian Roman Code, should
be called Pater-pater familiis, fath-
er of the Ohio family.
There's Schwertley of Iowa, who
never acts inertly in class. And
there's Langston, presumably a pro-
hibition outlaw of Bryan's state.
There's Sanford, who, except for the
sand in the fore part of his name
might be the celebrated Ford of Mich-
igan. There's the circus man from
the show-me state of Mo.
There is a Miner from Pennsyl-
vania, doomed always to be non sui
juris because under the age of twen-
ty-one. Yes, and there's Doran and
the Craugh of the New York delega-
tion. And there is Wilson of Ten-
nessee who is guilty of the tort of
conversion for having wrongfully
appropriated the good name of the
president of the United States.
There is the congenial Conway who
chews the cud from Oklahoma; and
Chester A. Wynn of Kansas. I
knew a Chester A. Arthur, but if
this man Wynn will add a "d" to his
name he might become a whirlwind
in the legal profession. We cannot
ask the question this year, "Has any-
body seen Kelly?" so me must substi-
tute Murphy of Wisconsin.
There is the Illinois delegation,
Culkin, Dixon, Paden, Schiavone and
Jones. These fellows call to mind
how a *typical Dutchman tried to
work a joke on his wife that had just
been perpetrated on him. A fellow
said to this Dutchman: "John, did
you hear that noise?" "No," said
John, "vat noise?" "Illinois." "Ho!
ho. I'll chust go right avay and get
dat on my wife," said John and to the
rear of his bakery he went. "Hey,
Vife, did you hear dat racket?"
"What racket?" "Illinois, ha- ha-"
Ardo Reichert and Romine Peich-
ert remind me of Romulus and Remus
of Rome. I almost forgot Scott of
California. Great Scott. I know he
is not old enough to be the hero of
the Dred Scott decision. Great Scott.
Words have many synonyms but
synonyms for phrases are hard to
find. There is a good one for great
scott, however, and that is Gee
Whiz.
Now Gentlemen, pardon me, I don't
like you as lightly as my pertinent
remarks may import. "I Really Do
Love You." is the name of a song I
heard way back in the days of my
youth. And if it were not for the
noise I'd make, I'd sing that song to
you now. (Sing, if demanded, as fol-
lows: "I really do love you, I'll take
,the name of Patterson and you take
Bridget Donahue"). Gentlemen, I
really do love you. I like you as in-
dividuals, I am proud of you as a
class. You are above the average of
any former class. And it need not
detract from the volume of sincerity
of this compliment to tell you that
we say that every year at the fresh-
men banquet, for we always say it in
the superlative degree, and you are
the last class.
But speaking seriously, Freshmen
Lawyers of 1919, I wish you all back
for 1920. You have made an excel-
lent start and will succeed admirably.
With the splendid new law building
and facilities added and the improv-
ed course that will be offered you
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will have opportunities and a law
course unexcelled by any in the
country. Your condition just now
reminds me of the prediciment of the
real estate agent who was about to
close a sale of property site in a little
country town on the river, when the
prospective purchaser wrote to in-
quire whether there was a mill at the
place. There being no mill the agent
dolefully informed him as follows:
"Dear Sir: We have a splendid dam
by a mill site, but no mill by a damn
site." Come back next year and work
by our beautiful dam site and I'll as-
sure you the mill.
FOOT BALL PARLANCE
Coumbus, Ohio, Dec. 7, '21.
Senior Law Class:-






Care State Bar Examiners,
Columbus, Ohio.




The semester examinations are
over, and the last marker we passed
was "Four months to LL. B." It
seems but yesterday that we heard
the little talk Judge Vurpillat gave
us on our first day out as college
men. It was rather hard to bleieve
that time would go so fast, when we
were down looking up-but now that
we are up looking down, we can easi-
ly see that the time has slipped all
too quickly.
Registration for the second semes-
ter was not nearly so complicated as
for the first. Many of us, however
suered severe fright when the Stu-
dents' office neglected to credit us
with well-earned grades.
We know some skeptics who be-
lieve that a man can't talk his way
through school. Perhaps, he can't,
but we can name some fellows who
are singing their way through. E. g.
Fred Dressel, Jim Murphy, Mark
Storen, etc. Truly, "music hath
charms."
John Klllelea and Robert Fallo-
way finished their courses in Janu-
ary, and have departed for unknown
destinies. John will probably take
the Illinois bar "exam"e in March,
while Bob will see what the New
York examiners have to ask of him.
Good luck to you both!
Albert "Duke" Hodler, worthy
representative of Oregon, and famed
football player of the Northwest dur-
ing 1919 and 1920 was associate
coach of the freshmaan team last
fall. He and Barry Holton acquitted
themselves in great style.
John McGinnes, who spent his first
years of law at the University of
Washington, has pitched in with the
Seniors in the final assault on the
law. George Dawson, former stu-
dent at Minnesota, has entered the
Junior class.
The Junior Moot Court ended with
the first semester and the Class of
'23 will take up trial work. The first
case on the docket is to be fought out
by Messrs. Lennon, Tschudi, Coch-
rane and Glotzbach. The reputation
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of these men is enough to insure us
an interesting and competent presen-
tation of the rights of the respective
parties.
While Notre Dame does not require
a degree for entrance into the Law
College, still there are not a few
budding barristers who possess them.
In the Junior Class there are at least
five who have sheepskins, and many
more who have completed two or
three years of pre-legal work. A de-
gree in liberal arts is most desirable
for the man who intends to follow
law and it is to be hoped that the un-
derclassmen will take every oppor-
tunity they have to get electives in
the other colleges.
The famous quartet of Garvey,
Kane, Degree and Seyfrit, is broken
up with Hector's withdrawal from
the school.
Many distinguished senior law-
yers have hied themselves off the
campus for this semester. Among
them are Art Keeney, Vince Pater,
Steve Carmody and Frank Hughes.
"Red" Holleran from "somewhere"
is beginning his after-Xmas work
with new ambition, after spending
his vacation manifesting special in-
terest in the belles of South Bend.
We think his time was profitably
spent as he is now giving up theor-
etical for the practical side of the
law. This is a practical age, "Red."
The Sophomore impromptu argu-
ments on technical legal questions
and weighty problems in general, are
attracting much attention from up-
perclassmen and professors, espec-
ially from Prof. Whitman, the libra-
rian, who continually insists upon
them being "louder."
"Boy." Brady from Utah says it
is no disgrace for one coming from
the Great Salt Lake region to be
called a "floater." Salt, he argues,
is a security that' text-book writers
have omitted in their legal treatises.
In his jocular way, Prof. Hunter
voiced an opinion recently in his
eight o'clock class that a time-clock
would greatly lessen his work in tak-
ing care of the late arrivals. Local
opinions, though not usually follawed
in the law, certainly invite inspection
and often praise.
Thomas Barber, the first in class
alphabetically, while pursuing his
studies "with diligence and assidui-
ty" a ]a Blackstone, astounded his
fellow-classmates by aslqing this
question: "Is there any moral or le-
gal objection to a man marrying his
widow's sister if there is no breach
of the public peace?"
The worth of a Law College can
be determined by the number or the
percentage of its students who pass
the State Bar examinations on their
first attempt. Using this rule as a
guide, The Hoyne's College of Law
must be reckoned well up in front.
All of the students of the class of
1921 who took the bar examinations
have passed and one of these stu-
dents led the class of Tennessee. The
others finished well up in their re-
spective state examinations. It looks
as though Notre Dame would con-
tinue her wonderful success in this
class of 1922 have already passed
the Ohio Bar, John Buckley and Vin-
cent Pater. We point with pride to
the record that the former students
of Notre Dame have made after
they have taken up the practice of the
Law. The Faculty of the Law
School deserves great credit for the
success of the Notre Dame men be-
cause it is largely through their ef-
forts that this fact has been made
possible.
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ALUMNI DEPARTMENT
Memorandum on the Sherman Law
What It Is and What It Is Not.
By OLIVER E. PAGAN,
Special Assistant to the Attorney-General.
A.
Congress has sole and plenary
power to regulate-to prescribe rules
for governing-interstate commerce.
This power has been little used.
Congress has passed laws which do
regulate-
The business of interstate common
carriers.
The care of livestock transported
in interstate commerce.
The interstate transportation of
explosives, etc.;
And laws which prohibit-





Game killed in violation of State
law, etc.
When States undertake by law to
encroach upon this power of Con-
gress, their laws are nullified by the
Federal courts in cases coming be-
fore them.
When individuals or corporations
undertake to usurp this power of
Congress in certain ways, they viol-
ate the Sherman law.
The Sherman law, then, is not a
law to regulate interstate commerce
but is a law to prevent certain pri-
vate regulations of or interferences
with interstate commerce which an-
ticipate the action of Congress, leav-
ing all others untouched.
B.
The title of the Sherman law is
"An Act to protect trade and com-
merce against unlawful restraints
and monopolies.'
The word "unlawful" in the title
implies that there are lawful re-
straints and monopolies, and that
these are not within the purview of
the Act. For example-
The incidental elimination of com-
petition arising from the formation
in a normal way or partnerships or
corporations out of competitive units
or from purchases under normal con-
ditions of the businesses of competi-
tors, they going out of business un-
der the terms of the sale, are lawful
restraints; and patents give lawful
monopolies to patentees, their les-
sees and assigns, though not any
right to form unlawful combinations
with other patentees or others to se-
cure benefits over and above the
benefits granted by the patents. Note
that a patentee has an exclusive
right to make, use and vend the art-
icle he invents. Copyrights are in the
same class. Exclusion is the main
feature of all monopolies.
C.
The two important sections of the
Sherman law are as follows:
"1. Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. Every person
who shall make any such contract, or
engage in any such combination or
conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars, or
by imprisonment not exceeding one
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year, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
"2. Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize
or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, shall be deem-
ed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding five thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the
court."
D.
The Sherman law is a law to pre-
vent-
1. Carrying on interstate trade
by unlawful methods, looking (a)
merely to the benefit of the actor or
actors through the exclusion of com-
petitors from the trade (monopoly
provisions of Sec. 2 and conspiracy
provisions of Sec. 1), or (b) to the
benefit to the actors arising from the
use of "unified tactics" on their part,
with injury (conspiracy-monopoly
provision of Sec. 2 and conspiracy
provision of Sec. 1) or without in-
jury (contract and combination pro-
visions of Sec. 1) to competitors;
2. Persons not carrying on the
trade in question from interfering,
by unlawful or tortious means, either
gratuitously or to obtain a collateral
benefit, gratify spite, or coerce action
in some extraneous matter, with the
carrying on of that trade by another,
or with the course of trade between
others (conspiracy provision of Sec.
1).
E.
The Sherman law touches the com-
mon law only in the phrase "restraint
of trade," the meaning of which was
fixed at common law in numerous
decisions upon contracts the enforce-
ment of which was sought in civil
sdits, and in a few decisions in crim-
inal cases of conspiracy to restrain
trade, principally growing out of
concerted but peaceable efforts of
workmen to secure better wages.
Carrying on trade under tacit
understandings, or "unification tac-
tics," not in the contractual form
(the Sherman-law combination),
was unnoticed in common-law times,
is not unlawful in England today,
and is lawful in the United States
only as it is made so by such specific
provisions as that in Section 1 of the
Sherman law. Just here is the reason
for the difference between the Eng-
lish and American decisions. It is
not a difference in reasoning, but is
one arising out of the positive pro-
visions of the American law. The
conrts of both countries are bound
by the common law until it is changed
by statute. It has been changed in
this country but not in England, as
to the matter here under consider-
ation.
In England, because of recent
legislation against it, a charge of
conspiracy cannot now be predicated
upon mere concerted efforts of work-
men peaceably to secure better
wages; nor can such a charge be here
based upon the Sherman law. A re-
cent statutory provision by Congress
forbids considering labor organiza-
tions unlawful combinations so long
as their purposes are legitimate.
Producers of farm products, more-
over, are exempted by law from be-
ing charged with violating the Sher-
man law merely because they fix
reasonable prices for their products
by agreement.
Contracts in restraint of trade are
in terms made illegal by Section 1 of
the Sherman law. They were not
unlawful at common law. They were
merely unenforcible in the courts be-
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cause against public policy, with one
exception: A contract in restraint of
Lrade in which the vendor of a busi-
ness and its good will agreed to keep
out of the business for such a reason-
able time or within such a reason-
able distance as to insure the pur-
chaser's obtaining the benefit of his
purchase was enforcible. As a re-
sult of modern conditions, such time
and distance are now, in England,
treated with greater liberality than
they formerly were. The same ex-
ception and like liberality of treat-
ment are accorded contracts in re-
straint of trade in the United States,
the one by force of the common law
and the other by reason of modern
con:siderations in its application.
Just here lies the only opportunity
there is to consider reasonableness in
cfminection wih restraints of trade.
The idea that reasonableness has any
bearing upon combinations or con-
spiracies of some traders to injure
others, or upon gratuitous and torti-
ous interferences with the business
of traders by non-traders, is as ab-
surd as the idea of reasonable burg-
law.
The word monopolize is used in
the Sherman law in a sense unknown
to the common law. Monopolies of
trade at common law were granted by
the crown. An exclusive right was
given by the crown. The monopoly
of the Sherman law arises from a
grasping by traders of the trade
from their competiors by unlawful
'methods of carrying on business, re-
sulting in, or tending towards, the
exclusion of competitors from the
trade. The excuse for the word's be-
ing used in the Sherman law lies in
the fact that the exclusion feature is
common to both the common-law and
the Sherman-law monopoly-the re-
sult is the same in both cases, altho
the methods of obtaining the two
kinds of monopoly differ, in that the
one proceeded from the act of the
Crown while the other proceeds from
the acts of individuals.
Again, a monopolist at common
law usually had an exclusive right in
the whole of a given line of trade,
while under the Sherman law one
begins to monopolize a line of trade
as soon as he begins to use unlawful
methods in carrying on his business.
The size of the business, absolutely
or relatively, is not the criterion of
monopoly under the Sherman law at
all. We may be sure that when Con-
gress gets ready to limit the volume
of business one may do honestly, it
will provide some means of keeping
track of all business done and of fur-
nishing all concerns engaged in each
line of business with the information
that will prevent the ones doing a
dangerously large percentage of the
business from passing the limit fix-
ed by law. It will be a long time be-
fore Congress does any such thing as
this.
Indeed, if monopoly under the
Sherman law has any reference to
the comparative size of the business,
a small concern using unlawful met-
hods of carrying on its business can-
not be touched until it has secured
by such methods say over half of the
business. This consideration alone
reduces the proposition that a big
business, as is popularly supposed, is
a monopoly to an absurdity, because
a single concern is amenable to the
Sherman law only for monopolizing
under the second section of law and
not at all under the first section,
which requires the co-operation of
two or more.
F.
Expanding the foregoing, and
drawing permissible inferences
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therefrom, we may say, that-
The first section of the Sherman
law addresses itself only to restraints
of trade through contracts, com-
binations or conspiracies.
Contracts and combinations in re-
straint of trade seek to benefit the
parties thereto at the expense of the
public.
Conspiracies in restraint of trade
seek to benefit the conspirators at the
expense of traders outside of the
conspiracy. The conspirators may
or may not be traders themselves.
If a group of traders seek to injure
its competitors outside of the group
by grasping the trade through met-
hods so unlawful as to exclude such
competitors from the trade, or to
tend to that result, they not only
conspire in restraint of trade but
they conspire to monopolize the
trade.
If conspirators not in the trade
seek to injure concerns in trade, by
unlawful interferences, they con-
spire to restrain trade but they do
not monopolize or grasp the trade to
themselves. There is, however, a dis-
thiction between a direct object to
injure and a direct object to benefit
the parties "conspiring" in a legiti-
mate way with only incidental injury
to others.
The second section of the law ad-
dresses itself only to methods of do-
ing business not normal or usual; i.e.
to unlawful methods within the
meaning of those terms as defined
by the courts; and so it addresses it-
self to monopolization, in the sense
of vexing, disturbing or distorting,
the whole of the trade in any line, it
being a part of the whole trade of the
country. It is to be noted that the
second section covers the case of a
single concern grasping business
from its competitors by unlawful
methods.
The Sherman law is not a law to
condemn transactions which have al-
ways been normal in business even
if incidental effects, having the ap-
pearances of restraints of trade or
of competition, flow therefrom. We
may instance a transaction involving
the outright purchase of a competi-
tor's business and property when it
is bona fide and does not come at the
end of a campaign of unfair and tor-
tious trade methods used by the pur-
chaser to put the seller in a position
where he must sell. The fact that
the competition formerly existing
between the parties is eliminated by
the sale does not make the transac-
tion a "combination in restraint of
trade." Only separate and present-
ly-existing concerns can engage in a
combination within the meaning of
the first section. A concern that
goes out of existence cannot engage
in a continuing combination. A de-
funct thing cannot function in any
way. Of course anything lawful in
itself may be a step in an unlawful
plan.
The Sherman law is not to reduce
all concerns to one level by compel-
ling large concerns to divide their
business with smaller ones; i.e. not
a law to maintain the poor, incapable
or inefficient at the expense of the
rich, capable or efficient, to handicap
large concerns for the benefit of
small ones, to give the small ones ad-
vantages in their struggle for exis-
tence, or to enforce the golden rule,
or any rule but that of lawful com-
petition, which necessarily carries
with it the idea that success, it may
be at the expense of competitors, is
a necessary incident to the working
rule of competition, which the law
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now favors instead of a policy of gov-
ernmental regulation.
The Sherman law is not a law to
prevent a business concern from en-
joying all the results of its successful
competition lawfully conducted, even
a resulting "monopoly" in the pop-
ular sense of that word.
The Sherman law is not a law to
prevent a business concern from
"dominating" its own business, or
conducting it in any lawful way
which suits it, even if its methods
differ from those of other concerns
and seem calculated to drive such
others out of business or to wreck
its own business. Neither the courts
nor the Trade Commission can
supervise the business methods of
business concerns, or do anything
but preveut the use by them of un-
lawful methods.
The Sherman law is not a law to
compel a business concern to know
the extent of its competitors' busi-
nesses, individually or collectively, or
otherwise to attend to any business
but its own.
The Sherman law is not a law to
limit the amount of property or
money to be used or invested in a
given business, or to limit the num-
ber of "different enterprises a given
concern may conduct, whether re-
lated or not, even if they concern ne-
cessaries of life. The fact that legis-
lation on this subject is now under
consideration in Congress is proof
that the Sherman law does not cover
it.
The Sherman law is not a law to
put business concerns on the same
footing as inn-keepers and common
c-irriers in their dealings with the
public: i.e. not a law to prevent dis-
crimination by a concern between its
customers, or the choosing of its cus-
tomers, upon any theory that suits
it, without having to give a reason
for so doing.
The Sherman law is not a law to
authorize the courts to ignore the
rules of logic, or the well-settled
principles of the criminal or civil
law.
G.
Prevention, so far as the Govern-
ment is concerned, takes the forms
of criminal punishment for past, and
injunction against continued viola-
tion of the law.
That this law, contrary to usual
principles, provides for an injunc-
tion against the commission of crime
must be taken to indicate that Con-
gress felt an unusual tenderness to-
wards prospective violators of it, or
else that Congress foresaw that such
difficulties would arise in interpret-
ing the law as fairly to call for their
settlement, as to some practices at
least, in civil proceedings. The lat-
ter seems to have .been the view of
the Department of Justice in its ad-
ministration of the law.
H.
The conditions prevailing at the
time the Sherman law was enacted
have so far changed that the unlaw-
ful methods then freely used for
grasping trade from competitors
have mostly disappeared, and the
current practice is for traders to
adopt "unified tactics" coming with-
in the combination provision of Sec-
tion 1. Of course, combinations in
restraint of trade being in terms
made illegal by Section 1, the use of
such tactics constitutes an unlawful
method of doing business upon which
a charge of conspiracy to monopolize
under Section 2 may be based.
Furthermore, the "unified tactics"
now in vogue assume the form of the
idy plan of so-called open compe-
tition, which seems to be a lawyer-
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made scheme for inducing business
men to fool themselves and believe
that they can at the same time fool
the courts. This plan has recently
been properly characterized as
"teamwork to fleece the public." The
good old-fashioned method of trad-
ing was for each business man to at-
tend strictly to his own business
without consulting his competitors
or reporting the details of his busi-
ness to them from day to day. Above
everything else the Sherman law is
a law to preserve the normal and
condemn the abnormal method in
business. The Eddy plan is a ridi-
c lously abnormal method of com-
P. tition which would never have been
thought of if the Sherman law had
not been on the books. We can eas-
ily imagine what a cry of protest
would arise from business men if it
were proposed to compel business
men by law to do the things which
they now so willingly do in pursu-
ance of the Eddy plan. Let us hope
that this Eddy plan is the last ditch
of the Sherman law violators among
-traders.
Most of the violations of the Sher-
man law by non-traders-those who
interfere, foi- purposes of their own,
with the freedom of action by trad-
ers, in whose business they have only
a secondary interest, have been per-
petrated by laborers working for
traders directly or indirectly.
Under a government of law, no
sane person can claim a right to im-
pose punishment upon another for
not conducting his business accord-
ing to rules laid down by the person
aggrived, or wantonly to destroy
the business or property of one who
does not comply with his demands
in matters pertaining only indirectly
to the trade being carried on. And
yet laborers assume to do this, and
believe that the law is powerless to
interfere. Certain classes of labor,
ers, like the I. W. W., are honest
enough to say that their "right" to
do such things is above and outside
the law. The others, or at least their
representatives, seem to think, that
union organization endows them
with a species of sanctity that ex-
empts them from the operation of
the laws which society relies for its
continued existense. A recent de-
cision of the Supreme Court has dis-
abused the minds of unionists upon
this point, so much so that they now
talk of securing a repeal of the Sher-
man law, as though that were the
only law standing in the way of their
unconscionable claims. A state of
society wherein such things would be
permissible is unthinkable.
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NEWS ABOUT
LEO B. WARD, L. L. B., '20
Sunny California held the greatest
lure for Leo, and today we find him
diligently practicing law in the of-
fices of Hon. Jos. Scott, one of the
most renowned atorneys of the Pa-
cific coast. "Red" is making great
headway in the courts of Los Angeles,
and already he has successfully ar-
gued many important demurrers and
motions in big cases of Hon. Scott.
Leo's specialty is "Cinema Law"
and on his knowledge of this phase
of the law, he is building a wonderful
reputation for himself.
* * *
FRANK COUGHLIN, L. L. B., '21
In our very midst we happily find
this newly-born prodigy of the Law.
After his graduation last June,
Frank located himself in South Bend
and began his duties as assistant
prosecutor of St. Joseph County. He
has retained every scintilla of his old
football punch and fighting spirit and
uses it to a very decided advantage
in routing out and prosecuting crime.
As a consequence all bootleggers and
so-called entrepreneurs of vice and
crime are giving Frank the wary
eye.
At present we find him vigorously
campaigning for the nomination, in
the May primaries, for Prosecuting
Attorney on the Republican slate. Co-
incidentally, he is fighting, politically,
his friend and brother alumnus, Ed-
die Doran, a Democrat, but Frank
says: "All's fair in politics and love,"
and Frank ought to know, especially
about the latter, for he entered the
ranks of the "Brave Benedicts" last
May. More power to our old Foot-
ball captain.
SHERWOOD DIXON, L. L. B., '20
We hadn't heard from "Dix" for
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nearly two. years, but no news is
generally good news, and so it has
been in this instance. Just a few
weeks ago the staff received the won-
derful tidings of Sherwood's success-
ful fight in the Supreme Court of Il-
linois. His victory is truly marvel-
ous considering that he has been out
of college scarcely two years, and al-
ready has a victory, in the Illinois
Supreme Court, chalked up on his
legal record.
This success is still another pre-
eminent proof of the excellence of the
Hoynes College of Law, ond plainly
bespeaks of the academic and legal
merit of its professors.
EDWIN DORAN, L. L. B., '20
"Eddie," president of the Senior
Law Class of '20, was last month tak-
en in as a junior partner in the South
Bend law firm of "Shivley, Gilms, &
Arnold," and the name of "Doran"
now follows that of Arnold and it is
letered in gold on the office doors of
the firm.
Nearly every day Eddie can be
found before one of the local courts
fighting or arguing a case in true
Notre Dame style. Just recently we
were greeted with Eddie's political
card, announcing his candidacy for
the nomination of Prosecuting At-
torney on the Democratic ticket.
JOE SUTTNER, L. L. B., '10
"Joe" recently passed the Califor-
nia Bar Examination, and after being
sworn in he immediately opened up
an office in Los Angeles. Joe's first
case was of a most technical nature,
but his mastery of the rights of ri-
parian land owners brought him vic-
tory in this judicial contest-his
initial litigation.
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J. C. SHEA, L. L. M., '17
Mr. Shea was elected president of
the Dayton Ohio Bar Association, in
the last convention of the Daytonian
Barristers. At this same convention,
Thomas Ford, another Notre Dame
Lawyer, was chosen as treasurer.
JOHN L. WEISEND, Law, '18, '19, 20
Leaving Notre Dame in '20, "Sus-
an" finished his course at Ohio
Northern University, Aeh flhio,
and was graduated in June oi '21. He
passed the State Bar exam. the same
month and since then has affiliated
himself with the eminent law firm of
"Dowling, Dowling & Moriarity" in
Cleveland.
"Susan's" hobby is trial work, and
as a young trial lawyer he is getting
along exceptionally well. Last month
he won a "suit" for a large clothing
company.
J. P. O'HARA, L. L. B., '20
Comes now the above titled defend-
ant prancing down the highway of
political success on a Democratic
charger, telling us that he is to be
the very next Probate Judge of Mc-
Leod County, Glencoe, Minnesota.
Certainly we all remember Joe
Patrick for his campus activities and
"extractivities" and sincerely hope
that our old friend and barrister will
not only survive the primaries but
will also emerge from the chaos of
this coming political melee, bearing
the palm alone.
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